




Save the Children
UK

Research Report

October 2009

**LIFE ON THE EDGE:
THE STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE AND THE
IMPACT OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN
HIGH RISK AREAS OF THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY**



Life on the Edge:

**The Struggle to Survive and the Impact of Forced Displacement in
High Risk Areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

Research Report

Save the Children UK

**Survey conducted by Near East Consulting
Supported by the Humanitarian
Aid department of the European Commission (ECHO)**

October 2009

EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid

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Life on the Edge:

The Struggle to Survive and the Impact of Forced Displacement in High Risk Areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

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October 2009

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Cover Image: A house destroyed in Izbet Abed Rabbu, North Gaza during the Israeli military offensive in Dec. 2008 - Jan. 2009. PHOTO/Osama Damo

Opposite Page: Children walk up the road carrying large sacks of wood in the the al-Salam area in Jabalia, north-western Gaza. Large parts of this area were destroyed during the Israeli military offensive which started in December 2008. Today, still no building materials can get through the Israeli blockade into Gaza for reconstruction to go ahead. PHOTO/Paolo Pellegrin / Magnum for Save the Children

Designed by: Marwan Hamad, InterTech, Ramallah

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Acronyms

DWG	Displacement Working Group
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
HRAs	High Risk Areas
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
NEC	Near East Consulting
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
UN	United Nations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

I. Acknowledgements

This report was developed by Save the Children UK and the research implemented by Near East Consulting as part of the project Prevention and Protection - A Programmatic Response to Forced Displacement in the OPT, which was made possible with funding from the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and cooperation from our implementing partner, MA'AN Development Centre.

Save the Children UK would like to offer special thanks to Jamil Rabah, Director of Near East Consulting, for his advice and support in developing the research and the tireless efforts of his team in conducting the field interviews and finalizing the data for the report. We would also like to thank the following individuals and organizations who helped review drafts of the report and provided specific feedback on analysis and findings: Karine Mac Allister, PhD Candidate in International Law at University of Montreal; Darryl Li, PhD Candidate in Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University; Karim Khalil, MSc in Political Economy and LLM in Humanitarian and Human Rights Law with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council; and the OCHA Research and Analysis Unit. We also offer special thanks to Magdalen Hess, who edited, organized and drafted the final version of the research; Rana El-Hendi, who translated the research from English to Arabic; and Marwan Hamad at InterTech Ramallah, for design and layout of the research report.

Save the Children UK expresses its deepest gratitude to the many families who participated in the research survey, allowing us to better understand the challenges and struggles they face. We dedicate this report to all these families in hopes for a better future for them and their children.

II. Preface

Save the Children UK has long supported Palestinian families dating back to 1949, when the charity began providing health services to Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon following the exodus of Palestinians from the newly created state of Israel. After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, Save the Children UK increased support for Palestinian partner organizations, focusing on technical assistance in health and education. In 2002 Save the Children UK established a full-time presence in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) and a separate country programme in 2007. Save the Children UK's work in the OPT focuses on promoting and protecting children's rights, protecting children from violence and abuse in their schools and communities, and providing emergency support in Gaza.

Save the Children UK has a programmatic and advocacy focus on children's empowerment within their families and communities, and the alleviation of child rights violations related to the armed conflict. Specific activities include: empowering children to engage and influence policy-makers; building and supporting local, national and international systems that monitor and document violations of children's rights; working with students, schools, teachers and parents to reduce violence and empower children's roles in decisions that impact them; and producing publications and communications that highlight child protection issues and hold responsible parties to account. By 2011, 10,800 children will benefit directly and thousands more will benefit indirectly from these activities.

In Gaza, Save the Children UK and the Save the Children Alliance provide emergency support to children and their families following Israeli military attacks and works to alleviate suffering resulting from the on-going Israeli blockade. For Save the Children UK, activities have included: rehabilitating damaged community centres; providing equipment and supplies to ensure provision of clean safe water; support for mother and child health and nutrition, especially for children with special needs; providing child specific kits, and educational and recreational activities.

All of the work undertaken by Save the Children UK is underpinned by concern for the particular vulnerabilities of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Save the Children UK has long sought to determine the effects of house demolitions and, by extension, all policies or actions that lead to the forced displacement of children and their families.

To this end, in 2009 Save the Children UK published a research¹ on house demolitions and children, based on a study conducted in 2007 with the Palestinian Counselling Centre and the Welfare Association, which revealed the devastating impacts of house demolitions on children and their families. Most notably, house demolitions were found to cause displacement, disruption of family life, separation of families, poverty, and trauma including depression and anxiety.

In the OPT, house demolitions are just one of multiple possible causes that result in displacement. Save the Children UK and the humanitarian community have realized that for

¹Save the Children UK, *Broken Homes: Addressing the Impact of House Demolitions on Palestinian Children and Families*, June 2009. Available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/54_8431.htm

advocacy and humanitarian responses to be relevant and targeted, more information was needed to understand why and how people are forcibly displaced, and what kind of response is necessary to ensure that displaced families can rebuild their lives and that at-risk communities are protected.

During 2008 and 2009, with funding from the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO), Save the Children UK together with its local partner, MA'AN Development Centre, implemented a project entitled, *Prevention and protection – a programmatic response to forced displacement in the OPT*. As part of this project, Save the Children UK commissioned Near East Consulting (NEC) to conduct this research in an effort to ascertain the contributing causes of forced displacement in the OPT, to inform the humanitarian and human rights communities of these root causes of forced displacement, and to facilitate the design of targeted legal and humanitarian responses that support displaced and at-risk families and communities.

III. Introduction

Background and Definitions

Displacement has been a part of the Palestinian experience since 1948, when the establishment of the state of Israel created hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees and IDPs. However, displacement of both Palestinian refugees and non-refugees is not limited to this historical event. Displacement is an ongoing and current political and humanitarian crisis for Palestinians across the OPT.

The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define internally displaced persons as *persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border*. Although not a legal definition, nor binding, the Guiding Principles are based on international human rights and humanitarian law.

The Guiding Principles prohibits the arbitrary or unlawful displacement of individuals and addresses the needs of individuals who have been displaced in terms of protection, assistance and solutions. According to Principle 6, displacement is considered arbitrary or unlawful in the following circumstances:

- a) When it is based on policies of apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" or similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population;
- b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
- c) In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests;

- d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation; and
- e) When it is used as a collective punishment.

This research takes a broad look at displacement and the various causes and contexts in which it occurs in the OPT. The research examines the vulnerabilities and pressures that cause displacement to better understand the factors that force families to leave their homes and ensure that protection responses are both comprehensive and relevant. The research looks not only at families who have been displaced as a result of Israeli policies and practices, such as house demolitions and frequent military incursions or settler attacks, but also those families who have changed their residence due to lack of access to essential goods and services and economic consequences related to prolonged conflict and occupation².

In addition, the research focuses on both IDPs as well as families who are at risk of displacement, as this latter category of individuals also faces heightened vulnerabilities and significant protection gaps. While these families do not fall within the definition of internally displaced persons according to the UN Guiding Principles, Save the Children UK still considers them eligible for a protection response based on their vulnerability and need.

For the purposes of standard protection programming responses, an IDP is considered eligible for the response as long as the family or individuals have not reached a level of stability that reduces the vulnerabilities associated with displacement. Therefore, a family living in a tent next to their destroyed home, for example, would still be considered displaced so long as they remain vulnerable and in need of a protection response. Once a family has found shelter, income and appears to be stable, according to agreed upon criteria, they would no longer be eligible for a standard protection response as their vulnerabilities had lessened.

From a legal standpoint, an IDP remains displaced until a durable solution is reached. Durable solutions are defined as *the means by which the situation of internally displaced persons can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved to enable them to live normal lives*³ and typically entail three options including, return and reintegration, integration in the place to which individuals were displaced or relocation and integration to a different location⁴.

Internal Displacement in the occupied Palestinian territory

Between 1967 and 2009, it is estimated that 128,708 Palestinians (originating from the West Bank or Gaza Strip) were internally displaced within the occupied territory⁵. This esti-

²For more discussion on economic migration, see International Committee of the Red Cross, *Internal Displacement in Armed Conflict Facing Up to the Challenges*, November 2009.

³Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre/The Norwegian Refugee Council, *Displaced by the Wall Pilot Study on Forced Displacement Caused by the Construction of the West Bank Wall and its Associated Regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, September 2006.

⁴See footnote #2 above.

⁵See Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009*. Estimate includes Palestinian refugees from 1948 who were subsequently internally displaced in the OPT. They numbered an estimated 37,000 individuals at the end of 2008, based on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) indicating that 1948 refugees constitute 40% of the total Palestinian population in the OPT.

mate includes Palestinians who were internally displaced as a result of the 1967 war⁶, and in subsequent decades as a result of house demolitions⁷, harassment by Israeli settlers in the Hebron city centre⁸, revocation of residency rights in East Jerusalem⁹, the construction of the Separation Wall¹⁰, and Israeli military actions¹¹ in Gaza. Internal displacement however, is difficult to track as ceasefire lines have changed frequently and there is no internationally recognized border between Israel and the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967¹². Despite this, and though Palestinian NGOs have consistently highlighted the issue of displacement, the international community has only recently begun to understand the scope of the displacement phenomenon. This increased level of understanding led to the formation of a UN-led Displacement Working Group¹³ (DWG) through which organizations are beginning to respond to the needs of those who have been displaced or are at risk of displacement.

However, most of what is currently known about forced displacement in the OPT is specific to displacement triggered by house demolitions alone. This is largely due to the sheer volume of internal displacement linked to this trigger (between 2000 and January 2009, 10,105 Palestinian homes were demolished – a yearly average of 1,011 homes¹⁴), and the traumatic and obvious nature of this displacement. However, forced displacement in the OPT is also caused by a variety of other factors which are less well understood. This underscores the need for a more comprehensive grasp of the displacement phenomena, current responses, and gaps that need to be filled. The humanitarian community recognizes the void of relevant and comprehensive information on the full range of displacement triggers, and this research is an effort to begin filling that void.

In the OPT, internal displacement is often caused by one or more of several events or circumstances, including but not limited to house demolition; forced eviction by military or security forces; land confiscation; fear or concern for personal safety; residency revocation/civil documentation issues; limited access to basic services such as water and sanitation; or as a result of movement restrictions due to obstacles such as the Separation Wall, road closures, curfews, checkpoints, the Gaza “buffer zone”, and closed-military zones. Many of these triggers for displacement occur or are especially prevalent in specific areas of the OPT and thus, communities situated within these areas are therefore considered at high risk of displacement. The humanitarian community¹⁵ has identified those high risk areas (hereafter referred to as HRAs) as the:

⁶Includes 10,000 internally displaced persons from destroyed Palestinian villages in the OPT during the 1967 war adjusted by the average annual population growth rate (3.5%) until 2005, and 3.0% for the years 2006 – 2008. See Badil 2008-2009 Survey

⁷An average of 1,037 Palestinians were displaced by house demolition each year between 1967 and 2008. This figure is not adjusted according to average annual population growth. See Badil 2008-2009 Survey

⁸In 2007, at least 1,014 Palestinian housing units in the Hebron city centre were vacated by their occupants. See B'Tselem and The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), *Ghost Town*, May 2007. This figure was multiplied by the average household size of 6.1 individuals and the annual population growth rate of 3.0%. See Badil 2008-2009 Survey

⁹The total number of ID cards confiscated since 1967 is 8,269 (see PCBS, 2008: Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, no. 10, p. 358). This does not include the very recently published data from the Israeli Ministry of the Interior indicating that 4,577 East Jerusalem residents had their residency revoked in 2008 (See HaMoked Press Release, 1 December 2009, available at: http://www.hamoked.org.il/news_main_en.asp?id=870). See Badil 2008-2009 Survey

¹⁰More than 14,000 individuals were displaced by the Wall as of July 2005 (see PCBS, 2008: Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, no. 10, p. 366), with the population growth rate (3.0%) added for 2006-2008. See Badil 2008-2009 Survey

¹¹For example, during last winter's 'Cast Lead' offensive (27 Dec 08 – 18 Jan 09), more than 3,500 homes were destroyed and over 2,800 were severely damaged. See OCHA Special Focus, *Locked In: The Humanitarian Impact of Two Years of Blockade on the Gaza Strip*, August 2009.

¹²For more discussion on the estimate of internally displaced Palestinians, see page 71, Appendix 2.1: Notes for Table 2.1 in Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2006-2007*, March 2007.

¹³Formed in 2007, the DWG is comprised of UN agencies and NGOs with a mandate both to improve immediate, short and long-term coordinated responses to displacement events as well as to address the root causes of displacement.

¹⁴The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, *Statistics on House Demolitions (1967-2009)*, April 2009.

¹⁵Includes UN agencies as well as international and local NGOs

- **Gaza “buffer zone”**

An Israeli declared and enforced “buffer zone” along the entire perimeter of Gaza bordering with Israel in the north and east. The “buffer zone” extends anywhere from 1 to 2 kilometres deep into primarily agricultural land that lies close to the border areas. The Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s southern border with Egypt also forms part of a “buffer zone” where enforcement lies with Egyptian border patrol forces and the Palestinian Authority¹⁶. Currently, no definitive estimation exists of the at risk Palestinian population living in areas near or adjacent to the “buffer zone” because in reality, the exact delineation of this area is unclear.

- **Communities located in Area C¹⁷**

There is no definitive data on the population of Area C, as the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C (in accordance with the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip) did not reflect or take into account the boundaries of existing population centres, with the result that towns and villages rarely fall entirely within one area. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there are 418 villages with at least part of their built up area located in Area C, including 161 villages with a majority of their built up area in Area C and 130 villages completely inside Area C. OCHA estimates that 44,100 Palestinians live in the 130 villages completely inside Area C. Given the number of mixed A/B/C villages, the actual population is certainly much higher¹⁸. OCHA estimates that more than 228,600 Palestinians reside in the 418 West Bank villages that have at least part of their built up areas in Area C¹⁹. According to estimates by the Israeli organization Bimkom, approximately 150,000 Palestinians reside in Area C²⁰.

Seam Zone

- The seam zone refers to those areas of the West Bank that are situated between the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice Line) and the Separation Wall. While there is overlap between population figures for the seam zone and Area C, the population living in the seam zone areas are particularly vulnerable to Israeli policies and practices. In a study of the humanitarian impact of the Wall and its associated permit regime in the northern West Bank, OCHA estimates based on community sources indicate that over 9,000 Palestinians were living in the seam zone areas declared ‘closed’ by Israeli military order in the Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and Salfit districts²¹. While not a comprehensive estimate, this figure points to a sizeable population that is both extremely marginalized and vulnerable.

¹⁶Per the Agreed Arrangements Regarding the Deployment of a Designated Force of Border Guards along the Border in the Rafah Area signed by Israel and Egypt on 1 September 2005. See Neuman, Brooke. “A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part I): Contents of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement.” 19 September 2009. Available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2374> and Herzog, Michael. “A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part II): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement.” 21 September 2009. Available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2376>

¹⁷Area C is the area of the West Bank that is under Israeli military control, including the building and planning spheres, and comprises approximately 61% of the West Bank. See UN OCHA, *Special Focus: “Lack of Permit” Demolitions and Resultant Displacement in Area C*, May 2008.

¹⁸An additional factor impeding the ability to precisely determine the Area C population is that the distribution of the population within a particular village is unknown, i.e. while it is generally possible to ascertain what percentage of a locale’s built-up area is located in Area C vs. Area A or B, no data exists indicating the distribution of population in these areas.

¹⁹OCHA, *Special Focus: “Lack of Permit” Demolitions and Resultant Displacement in Area C*, May 2008.

²⁰Bimkom Planners for Planning Rights, *The Prohibited Zone Israeli Planning Policy in the Palestinian Villages in Area C*, June 2008.

²¹OCHA, *The Barrier Gate and Permit Regime Four Years on: Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank*, November 2007.

● East Jerusalem

Since 1967, when Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem, the city's Palestinian inhabitants have experienced high incidence of house demolition, residency revocation and eviction, increasing levels of poverty, dwindling access to public services, and increasing restrictions on their freedom of movement. According to the 2007 Census conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the population of that part of Jerusalem which was annexed by Israel following its occupation in 1967 stood at 225,416²². Recently released data from the Israeli Ministry of Interior indicated that 4,577 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem (including 99 minors) lost their Israeli residency status in 2008²³. According to this data, the Israeli rights group HaMoked warned that the number of cases of residency revocation in 2008 alone is equal to approximately one half the total number of cases of residency revocation between 1967 and 2007²⁴.

This study endeavours to assess and compare the living conditions and experiences of Palestinians residing in selected HRAs against those of Palestinians living across the OPT, excluding East Jerusalem. This research seeks to make clearer the relationship between suspected displacement triggers and the phenomenon of internal displacement in the HRAs and OPT generally. While it is important to note that displacement risks are high and house demolitions and forced evictions are all too common in East Jerusalem, the decision to exclude the area from this study is based on the unique nature of the situation and the different policy and legal issues that lead to displacement in East Jerusalem.

IV. Methodology

Save the Children UK, through Near East Consulting (NEC), conducted the research through two surveys: one administered to a sample of Palestinians living in selected HRAs and another administered to a general sample of Palestinians living across the OPT. Save the Children UK worked closely with NEC to develop the survey questionnaire, which was tested several times to ensure clarity and accuracy of response. In July 2009, trained NEC staff simultaneously conducted both surveys.

In the HRAs sample, NEC fieldworkers administered the survey through face-to-face interviews with 472 Palestinians over the age of 18 in which each interviewee represented a unique household. Save the Children UK pre-selected specific communities (13 in the West Bank and 16 in Gaza) in HRAs based on locations in which our forced displacement work was ongoing as well as in close consultation with OCHA and other members of the DWG. Within each community, fieldworkers randomly surveyed 10-15 households (see Table 1, below). In two instances, fieldworkers could not enter the identified communities as a result of severe Israeli-imposed access restrictions to these areas. In both instances, fieldworkers selected a nearby Palestinian community as an alternative (See Table 1, below). The questionnaire for the HRAs sample included questions about household living conditions and the availability of basic services, income and livelihoods, psychosocial well-being,

²²Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007*, August 2008.

²³HaMoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual, Press Release, 1 December 2009.

²⁴Ibid.

changes in residence and the reasons why, movement and access restrictions and available coping mechanisms.

The general survey (represented by OPT in the Figures and Tables below) serves as a control²⁵, providing an overall picture of Palestinian life against which to compare the HRAs. In addition, the general survey provides data on the prevalence of displacement risk and impacts across all areas of the OPT. With the exception of several questions developed specifically for the HRA respondents, the surveys were identical. NEC staff conducted the general survey by telephone interview using random digit dialling via landline. NEC conducted a total of 1,057 random telephone interviews with the individual who answered the phone provided that the respondent was over the age of 18. Each respondent represents a unique household and is not necessarily the head of household.

Save the Children UK acknowledges the weakness of the survey methodology with regards to capturing the perspective of children and ensuring gender balance (See Figure 1, below). Despite this, the survey is significant in terms of assessing the vulnerabilities of families living in HRAs as well as the needs to be addressed in a coordinated response. Table 1 (below) shows the demographic distribution of both samples.

Table 1: HRAs Surveyed and Number of Households Surveyed

Region	Governorate	Area	# of Households	
West Bank	Tulkarem	Al Jarushiya	20	
	Qalqiliya	Habla ²⁶	18	
	Qalqiliya	Beit Amin ²⁷	15	
	Qalqiliya	Izbat at-Tabib	12	
	Ramallah	Beit 'Ur al Fauqa	20	
	Hebron	Ar Ramadin	15	
	Hebron	Khirbet Zanuta	15	
	Hebron	At Tuwani	10	
	Hebron	Qawawis	10	
	Bethlehem	Al Khas	15	
	Bethlehem	Khallet an Nu'man	15	
	Jericho	Al Jiftlik ²⁸	47	
	Tubas	Tammun	20	
	Gaza Strip	North Gaza	Beit Hanoun	15
		North Gaza	East of Beit Lahiya	15
North Gaza		Al Siyafa, Al 'Atatra	15	
North Gaza		Eastern cemetery area	15	
Gaza City		East of Ash Shujaiyeh	15	

²⁵As a result of the random-digit dialing method used, it is likely that households located in high risk areas may have been contacted and surveyed as part of the general sample. We cannot ascertain how many households from high risk areas may have been included in the general sample, but the percentage would not be significant so as to skew results.


²⁶Surveyed instead of Azzun Atmeh, which was impossible to reach due to movement restrictions imposed by the Israeli military.

²⁷Surveyed instead of Arab Abu Fardeh, which was impossible to reach due to movement restrictions imposed by the Israeli military.

²⁸Al Jiftlik is composed of a number of scattered population centres.

Region	Governorate	Area	# of Households
	Gaza City	Karni Crossing area	15
	Gaza City	Nahal Oz Crossing area	15
	Middle Area	Johr al Deek	15
	Middle Area	East of Al Bureij refugee camp	15
	Middle Area	East of Maghazi refugee camp	15
	Khan Younis	Abasan al Kabira	15
	Khan Younis	Abasan al Saghira	15
	Khan Younis	Khuza'a	15
	Rafah	Shoka	15
	Rafah	Gaza Airport surroundings	15
	Rafah	Philadelphi Corridor	15
	Total		472

Figure I: Survey Demographics- HRAs and general sample



V. Summary of Findings

This research reveals a stark juxtaposition of Palestinian life in HRAs compared to that of the OPT in general. Section VI of the report, *Living Conditions, Socio-economic Status and Psychosocial Well-being*, highlights the striking vulnerabilities of families in HRAs with regards to their housing conditions, access to essential goods and services, socio-economic status and their psychosocial well-being. Families in HRAs were poorer compared with the general population and many had lost their sources of livelihood since the year 2000. The majority of families in HRAs own land and a sizeable number rely on agriculture for their livelihood. In the West Bank, livelihoods have been threatened by land confiscation and movement and access restrictions as a result of checkpoints and the Separation Wall. In Gaza, the dangers associated with accessing land located adjacent to or within the “buffer zone” have similarly threatened livelihoods. Housing conditions in HRAs were poor and access to essential goods and services was less available than in the OPT more generally. In addition, families in HRAs lacked personal security and suffered negative psychological impacts in greater numbers than the general population.

Section VII on *Displacement Triggers* examines the factors that lead to displacement among families in the OPT. Families in HRAs are more vulnerable to displacement compared with the OPT more generally. Common reasons for displacement in HRAs include house demolition and loss of income or source of livelihood. Since 2000, 31% of West Bank HRA households and 70% of Gaza HRA households have changed their residence, with a large majority of respondents identifying the impacts of Israeli policies and practices as the primary reason. Of these respondents, 89% were displaced following the destruction of their home, as a result of house demolition or destruction or damage in the course of Israeli military activity, as a result of Israeli orders²⁹, out of concerns for their physical safety and security, or due to inadequate shelter, which includes lack of services such as electricity and running water in the house.

Among the remaining 11%, respondents changed their residence for a variety of reasons, including family reunification and economic reasons. The research is limited in that it is impossible to fully understand the context of these responses. However, based on what is known about life in HRAs, some of these responses may be linked to Israeli policies. This includes cases of civil documentation and residency rights, as well as economic migration due to loss of livelihood and possibly as a result of land confiscation. Although the research cannot correlate this data with displacement, these responses may be viewed as factors adding to the vulnerability of families living in HRAs.

Section VIII of the research, *Other Vulnerabilities and Factors Related to Displacement*, examines land confiscation and movement and access restrictions as related factors that may lead to displacement in HRAs. The research indicates that families residing in HRAs face restrictions on their freedom of movement, especially in the West Bank, due to checkpoints, and land confiscation orders and land confiscation in greater numbers than among

²⁹Israeli orders include eviction orders, house demolition orders and land confiscation orders. While a land confiscation order cannot be directly correlated to displacement in this study, we can reasonably state that this adds to the vulnerability of families living in high risk areas.

the general population. While this research does not directly correlate land confiscation and movement and access restrictions with loss of income/livelihood and displacement, it appears clear that these are related factors adding to the vulnerability of families living in HRAs.

In Section IX, *Impacts and Coping Mechanisms*, the research indicates that families who have been displaced experience a marked decline in their living conditions and socio-economic and psychosocial well-being, regardless of the reason for displacement. Income loss and poverty both increase following displacement and in West Bank HRAs in particular; access to basic services declines. Coping strategies are used more extensively in high risk areas compared with the rest of the OPT. They are, however, dwindling or have largely been exhausted. Among those families who have been displaced, 78% wish to return to their homes despite the fears and vulnerabilities associated with life in HRAs.

Finally, although humanitarian assistance appears to be reaching those in need in Gaza, approximately half of households surveyed in HRAs in the West Bank said that humanitarian assistance was not available to them either from international organizations or local organizations despite deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and less access to services following displacement. Lack of assistance extends to legal support as well. The majority of families in both HRAs and the general population did not access legal services after receiving a house demolition or land confiscation order.

VI. Living Conditions, Socio-Economic Status and Psychosocial Well-being

Prior to the implementation of this survey, it was clear from field visits and anecdotal evidence that there were significant differences in living conditions and socio-economic status between the areas designated as at high risk of displacement and other areas of the OPT. Community level observations indicated higher levels of poverty, less access to basic services, higher levels of violence, and more strenuous overall living conditions in HRAs. To better understand the extent and scope of these differences, this study asked a series of questions on housing conditions, land ownership, access to basic needs and services, employment, income, poverty, personal security, and psychosocial well-being. The answers to these questions provide both a fuller understanding of the target groups and help to establish whether any correlations exist between living conditions, poverty, access to services, etc. and displacement.

A. Housing conditions and land ownership

The majority of the Palestinian population, whether in HRAs or other parts of the OPT, live in their own homes. However, there are notable differences in the condition of these homes. For example, 13% of the HRA respondents live in partially destroyed homes compared with 5% of the respondents in the general sample. An additional 8% of HRA respondents live in a tent over the rubble of a damaged house. Such responses were most stark in the Gaza “buffer zone”, where 34% of those surveyed reported living in a partially destroyed home or in a tent over the rubble of their homes.

Also, the quality of the structures themselves varies. Many families in HRAs (particularly in southern Hebron, the Jordan Valley, and in Bedouin/herder communities) live in one or two-room shacks or tents constructed of mud, corrugated tin, plastic sheeting, and/or plywood. Israeli restrictions that forbid new construction and renovation of existing structures, as well as building needed public infrastructure, and a lack of access to basic services in these areas (as outlined below) make improving the living situation for the residents difficult or impossible.

“... with the assistance of Save the Children UK, I was able to make renovations to my home and replace the corrugated metal roof with a wooden one. The metal was making our lives harder in the heat in the Jordan Valley... because the temperature here reaches the 40 degree Celsius mark in the summer – which was unbearable with a metal roof.”

– **Daoud (31 years), father of five in al Jiftlik village**

Figure 2 :Type of dwelling




Table 2:Type of dwelling, according to target population and place of residence³⁰

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
UNRWA	3%	5%	2%	3%
Their own house	83%	53%	94%	87%
Friend's house	3%	5%	2%	2%
Uninhabited building	0%	2%	0%	0%
A tent over the house's rubble	5%	12%	0%	0%
A tent in a refugee camp	0%	1%	0%	0%
Partially destroyed house	5%	22%	2%	8%

In addition to owning their own homes, 51% of the population in HRAs own land. Land ownership was high in both the West Bank and Gaza HRAs, correlating with the high rates of agricultural based income in those areas. Details on land ownership are shown in Figure 3 and Table 3 (below).

³⁰Due to rounding, response rates may not total 100%.

Figure 3: Land ownership




Table 3: Land ownership, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	58%	42%	42%	21%
No	42%	58%	58%	79%

B. Availability of basic services and necessities

The designation of areas as 'high risk' was not done arbitrarily. As noted above, these areas were selected based on consultations with the humanitarian community and experience and observations in the field that pointed to the fact that in these locations land confiscation, house demolitions, and movement restrictions are most severe, and access to basic services was most restricted. These observations were borne out through this survey, which reveals that access to basic needs and services, including adequate food supplies, healthcare and education in HRAs is significantly more limited than in other parts of the OPT.

“Water is another crisis in al Jiftlik. We receive minimal amounts of water - approximately 3.5 days a week. Thanks to the 1,000-liter water tank provided to us by Save the Children UK, we have water when there is limited or no supply.”

-57-year-old Adeebea, mother of 11 children in al Jiftlik, Jordan Valley

Surveyed respondents were asked to indicate whether a range of essential goods and services, freedom of movement and job security were 'available,' 'somewhat available,' or 'not available.' The 'somewhat available' response means only partially available but the meaning of this is highly subjective depending on the particular respondent. For example, one respondent may indicate that education is 'available' when the closest school is more than 10 kilometres away while another respondent in the same location may say 'somewhat avail-

able. 'Somewhat available' may also refer to the fact that a primary school is available in a given location but no kindergartens or secondary schools are located nearby. These nuances must be considered when analyzing the responses in the Figure 4 and Table 4 (below).


As illustrated in Figure 4, only 37% of the respondents in HRAs said that they have sufficient food, compared with 70% among the general population in the West Bank and Gaza. Availability of education, water and sanitation, and job security is also lower in these areas. Differences between West Bank and Gaza HRAs and the rest of the OPT are outlined in Table 4. Of particular note is the lack of health services, sanitation, freedom of movement, and economic security in West Bank HRAs, and the lack of physical security in both West Bank and Gaza HRAs.

In the Jordan Valley, 9,400 settlers consume approximately 6.6 times more water per capita annually than the 56,000 Palestinian residents³¹.

In Area C, settlers receive discounts from the Israeli water company of up to 75% while Palestinians connected to the Israeli water network are charged significantly higher prices³².

The daily per capita water consumption of Israelis is about four times as high as Palestinian per capita water consumption. In the marginalized Palestinian communities, residents survive on barely 20 litres of water per day, well below the World Health Organization's daily recommended 100 litres per capita³³.

Figure 4: Availability of services, security and freedom of movement



³¹PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, *A Village in the Way: al-Aqaba and the Grab of the Jordan Valley*, June 2006. Available at: <http://www.nad-plo.org/facts/col-sett/meskiyout2.pdf>

³²Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *al Majdal*, Double Issue no. 39/40 (Autumn 2008/Winter 2009). See Fathy Khdirat article, *The "Eastern Border": Palestinians of the Jordan Valley*, page 45. Available at: <http://www.badil.org/en/al-majdal/itemlist/category/3-issue39-40>

³³Amnesty International, *Troubled Waters - Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water*, 2009.

Table 4: Availability of services, security and freedom of movement, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Availability of food				
Available	41%	32%	75%	63%
Somewhat available	54%	62%	24%	36%
Not available	5%	5%	1%	2%
Availability of water				
Available	37%	37%	86%	78%
Somewhat available	41%	48%	11%	19%
Not available	22%	15%	3%	3%
Availability of education				
Available	39%	51%	65%	56%
Somewhat available	53%	46%	26%	36%
Not available	8%	3%	9%	8%
Availability of health services				
Available	8%	35%	66%	59%
Somewhat available	49%	54%	29%	34%
Not available	43%	11%	5%	7%
Availability of physical security				
Available	5%	19%	55%	38%
Somewhat available	32%	23%	31%	34%
Not available	62%	59%	14%	28%
Freedom of movement				
Available	6%	22%	54%	43%
Somewhat available	39%	50%	36%	38%
Not available	55%	28%	11%	19%
Availability of sanitation				
Available	2%	26%	61%	60%
Somewhat available	24%	49%	25%	27%
Not available	74%	25%	14%	13%
Economic security				
Available	10%	31%	36%	35%
Somewhat available	40%	27%	35%	29%
Not available	50%	41%	30%	37%

C. Employment, income and poverty

Since the start of the second *Intifada* in 2000, unemployment levels have shot up across the OPT. As shown in the Figures and Tables below, the percentage of people who have lost their jobs during this period is high among both population in HRAs and the general population. However, percentages are higher in the HRAs, with 45% of respondents reporting the loss of a job or income since 2000, compared to 31% among the general population. No significant differences were observed between the general population in the West Bank and the general population in the Gaza Strip; however, the HRAs of Gaza have had more serious levels of income loss than HRAs in the West Bank, as indicated in Table 5 (below). This may be partly explained by the ongoing Israeli blockade of Gaza, which resulted in the disintegration of 98% of its industrial economy³⁴. Since 12 March 2006, Erez Crossing, the only exit point between Gaza and Israel for people, has remained closed to Palestinian workers and since 12 June 2007, for all other Palestinians except for a limited number of traders, humanitarian workers and medical patients who have been granted special permits in order to exit³⁵. Between January 2006 and its closure on 12 March 2006, an average of 2,700 Palestinian workers and 120 traders had crossed Erez to travel into Israel³⁶. Rafah, the primary crossing point between Gaza and Egypt for people, has been closed for public use since 10 June 2007³⁷.

Figure 5: Respondents who lost their source of living since 2000




Table 5: Respondents who lost their source of living since 2000, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	41%	50%	32%	33%
No	59%	50%	68%	67%

³⁴The World Bank, *Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform*, 22 September 2008. Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCSept15.08.pdf>

³⁵OCHA, *Report No. 97 Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access and Update on Gaza Crossings*, 22 July - 04 August 2009. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_access_movement_agreement_no97_english.pdf

³⁶OCHA, *The Agreement on Movement and Access One Year On*, November 2006. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/AMA_One_Year_On_Nov06_final.pdf

³⁷OCHA, *Report No. 97 Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access and Update on Gaza Crossings*, 22 July - 04 August 2009. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_access_movement_agreement_no97_english.pdf

Among those who are employed, a majority work near their homes or within the district in which they live. The main difference between the two surveyed areas is that more people from HRAs work at home than do in the general population. As illustrated in Figure 6 (below), 13% of the breadwinners in HRAs work at home, compared to 3% of breadwinners in the general population. There may be two reasons for this difference. First, in HRAs a larger percentage of the population works in agriculture or animal husbandry. Second, greater movement restrictions in HRAs may limit access to work in areas away from the home.

Between the West Bank and Gaza the main difference is the percentage of workers who are dependent on work in Israel for their income. This can be explained by the ongoing Israeli blockade of Gaza, which prevents Palestinians in Gaza from gaining Israeli work permits. While movement restrictions and permit regulations are also a factor in the West Bank, more than 10% of the breadwinners in West Bank HRAs and among the general West Bank population work in Israel (see Table 6, below).

Figure 6: Employment location of breadwinner




Table 6: Employment location of breadwinner, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
In the house	14%	12%	1%	6%
In the same area of residence	41%	43%	38%	46%
In the same district of residence	19%	30%	33%	30%
Different district	5%	5%	12%	10%
Settlements	8%	0%	1%	0%
Israel	12%	0%	11%	2%
Retired	0%	9%	2%	2%
Other	1%	1%	2%	4%

Further breaking down employment and income data, the following Figures and Tables show the primary and secondary sources of income for families in each area. In HRAs the primary income for the majority of households comes from agricultural work, daily wage labour, or salaried employment with the PA. In the general sample, most respondents earned their primary income from daily wage labour, work in the private sector, or other full-time salaried employment. There were also significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza. As noted below, a higher proportion of Gaza's HRA respondents rely on PA salaries than do their counterparts in the West Bank. Additionally, aid from United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is the primary income source for a much more significant portion of the population in Gaza than in the West Bank.

Figure 7: Primary source of income




Table 7: Primary source of income, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Agriculture	33%	22%	2%	1%
Fishing	1%	0%	0%	0%
Animal husbandry	9%	3%	0%	0%
Daily wage earner	23%	9%	28%	12%
Salary from the PA	10%	23%	20%	41%
Salary from UNRWA	1%	4%	1%	4%
Salary from an NGO	0%	2%	0%	1%
Salary from an international organization	0%	0%	0%	0%
Salary from private sector	4%	3%	14%	12%
Own business	9%	7%	24%	14%
Seller	3%	3%	4%	3%
Charity	1%	8%	2%	3%

Aid from UNRWA	0%	11%	1%	5%
Aid from international organizations	0%	1%	0%	0%
Aid from Palestinian families	0%	1%	1%	0%
Aid from the PA	1%	0%	1%	0%
Other	3%	1%	2%	2%

Data on secondary income sources show some similarities between the general populations of the West Bank and Gaza, but there are significant differences between the HRAs of the West Bank and Gaza. For example, 39% and 31% of the general population in Gaza and West Bank respectively receive their secondary income from the PA. The next most significant secondary income sources in both areas are daily wage labour, self-run businesses, and the private sector (with the notable addition of UNRWA as an income source in Gaza). By comparison, in Gaza's HRAs, a majority of the population receive their secondary income from either UNRWA assistance (41%) or charity (19%). However, in HRAs of the West Bank, and despite high levels of poverty (detailed below) and unemployment, only a small percentage report UNRWA assistance (4%) or charity (6%) as a significant income source. The most significant secondary income sources in West Bank HRAs are animal husbandry, agriculture and daily wage labour.

Figure 8: Secondary source of income




Table 8: Secondary source of income, according to target population and place of residence


	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Agriculture	13%	2%	0%	2%
Fishing	1%	2%	0%	0%
Animal husbandry	17%	2%	1%	0%

Daily wage earner	12%	2%	21%	12%
Salary from the PA	8%	9%	31%	39%
Salary from UNRWA	2%	1%	1%	6%
Salary from an NGO	0%	2%	0%	0%
Salary from an international organization	0%	0%	0%	0%
Salary from private sector	5%	1%	13%	10%
Own business	9%	4%	21%	10%
Seller	5%	6%	3%	3%
Charity	6%	19%	1%	2%
Aid from UNRWA	4%	41%	2%	13%
Aid from international organizations	4%	3%	1%	0%
Aid from Palestinian families	2%	4%	1%	0%
Aid from the PA	1%	0%	1%	2%
Other	11%	2%	3%	1%

In addition to assessing income sources and employment levels, this study also provides an analysis of poverty. The poverty level was determined based on household size and current reported income, and the poverty line was determined based on figures set by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics³⁸.

The survey reveals significant differences in poverty levels between the general population and the population in HRAs. Sixty-nine percent of HRA respondents are either very poor or extremely poor; compared to 35% of the general public. In addition, extreme poverty levels among the general population in Gaza are more than twice those in the West Bank. The differences between the West Bank and Gaza may largely be attributable to Israel's blockade on Gaza and the impacts of ongoing conflict there. Overall poverty levels in HRAs of Gaza and the West Bank are more comparable (73% and 68% respectively).

Figure 9: Level of poverty



³⁸The poverty line is set by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) at 2,200 NIS for a family of two adults and four children.

Table 9: Level of poverty, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Extremely poor	29%	45%	10%	22%
Below poverty line	38%	27%	22%	20%
Below poverty line, incl. extremely poor	67%	72%	32%	42%
Above poverty line	32%	27%	68%	58%

D. Psychosocial well-being

Sense of security

The survey also asked respondents about their sense of security and safety in the communities where they live. Given the context of Israeli occupation and inter-factional Palestinian conflict, it was suspected that feelings of insecurity would be great. The survey confirmed these suspicions. Lack of physical security is a major concern for families living in HRAs: while 61% of the general sample respondents said that they feel secure, only 17% of HRA respondents (9% in Gaza, 23% in the West Bank) reported that they feel safe and secure.

Figure 10: Feeling a sense of physical security and safety in area of residence




Table 10: Feeling a sense of physical security and safety, according to target population and residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	23%	9%	64%	55%
No	47%	63%	18%	31%
To some extent	30%	28%	17%	13%

Of those who reported feelings of insecurity, the main reason given were actions and policies related to Israel's occupation. This was true for both HRAs and the general population, with 68% of the respondents from both areas attributing their feeling of insecurity to the policies and practices of the Israeli occupation. Only a very small number of respondents attributed their feelings of insecurity to inter-factional Palestinian violence or crime, as is shown in Figure 11 and Table 11 (below).

Figure 11: Reason for feeling physically insecure and unsafe




Table 11: Reason for feeling physically insecure and unsafe, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Practices of the occupation	70%	65%	70%	65%
Settlers	8%	0%	17%	1%
High crime rate	10%	2%	1%	1%
Security chaos	1%	6%	3%	12%
Internal conflict	3%	15%	2%	13%
Other	9%	12%	7%	8%

Psychosocial well-being

The survey assessed the psychosocial well-being of both the HRA and general populations through the use of a depression variable³⁹ that was initially developed by the World Health Organization for use in a study in Kosovo in 2005. The depression variable was slightly adapted for use in the OPT context.

Assessing the psychosocial well-being of respondents is a useful tool for measuring overall family and social health in communities because depression has serious impacts on families, and a significant factor in the mental health of children is the psychological well-being

³⁹The depression variable does not provide a clinical evaluation or diagnosis of depression but rather a general measure of the psychosocial well-being of respondents and allows for a comparison between populations in the HRAs and the general population.

of their parents. Research has shown that children tend to experience behavioural and emotional disturbances when their parents are not able to meet the children's needs due to being distracted with their own problems. In order for the humanitarian community to fully meet the needs of children, their families and communities, it is important to understand the psychological status of those impacted by or at risk of displacement.

The majority of the respondents among both the general sample and HRAs are depressed with levels reaching 56% among the general population and 75% among the population in HRAs. Breaking the numbers down further, extreme depression levels are highest in Gaza where 44% and 50% of respondents in HRAs and the general population respectively are extremely depressed. However, overall depression levels (79%) are highest in the West Bank HRAs, though levels in Gaza HRAs are almost as high (71%).

Figure 12: Psychological status




Figure 13: Level of depression




Table 12: Level of depression, according to target population and residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Extremely depressed	39%	44%	34%	50%
Depressed	40%	27%	23%	20%
In between	4%	7%	9%	6%
Not depressed	13%	14%	19%	11%
Not depressed at all	4%	8%	15%	12%

E. Summary

This study supports the findings of previous studies undertaken that point to the significant differences in basic quality of life indicators between areas defined as at 'high risk' of displacement and other areas of the OPT. Questions designed to assess housing conditions, access to basic services, employment, poverty, and income, have demonstrated significant disparities between households located within HRAs and those in the general sample. These disparities also include psychosocial factors such as feelings of security and safety, as well as levels of depression. These findings demonstrate that HRA communities are among the poorest, marginalized and vulnerable in the occupied territory.

Data presented in the next section draws the link between these disparities in access to services, socio-economic pressures, and psychosocial factors and families' decisions to change their residence in the hopes of finding suitable shelter, greater economic security and personal safety, and/or better access to services.

Participants of focus group discussions (consisting of 18 women and five men) in al Jiftlik (Jericho Governorate) and 'Atouf (Tubas Governorate), two at risk villages in the Jordan Valley, report:

- An inability to secure alternative sources of income to agriculture and animal husbandry. In 'Atouf village, participants reported that both are threatened, due mainly to lack of access to water.
- Daily struggles to supply their families with clean water: In al Jiftlik, participants said this was because Israeli soldiers confiscate water tanks and in 'Atouf, water must be transferred from another village at prohibitive cost (approximately 58 US dollars per transfer).
- Insufficient access to health care facilities, primarily in al Jiftlik.
- Children's access to education is difficult, largely due to long travel distances to and from schools.
- Children's psychological well-being is compromised due to the lack of physical security as a result of the policies and practices of the Israeli occupation.
- Children's educational achievement is adversely impacted by the combined effects of insufficient access to water and electricity, poverty, and psychological distress.

Overall, participants reported that they lack essential services such as water, electricity, transportation, and health care in addition to a general lack of physical security as a result of the Israeli occupation.

VII. Displacement Triggers

Much of what is understood about displacement in the OPT relates to house demolitions, but there are many other reasons why people are displaced in the OPT. Fully understanding the scope of displacement is important for both identifying the policies and practices that contribute to forced displacement, and for understanding the scope of the problem to inform response strategies. This survey therefore asked a series of questions designed to better understand the complex factors that contribute to and influence people's decision or desire to leave their homes and to pinpoint the scale of displacement in high risk areas in the OPT.

This research supports the findings of previous studies⁴⁰ that have examined the impact of the Separation Wall on communities living in seam zone areas confirming that lack of

⁴⁰See for example, Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre/Norwegian Refugee Council, *Displaced by the Wall, Pilot Study on Forced Displacement Caused by the Construction of the West Bank Wall and its Associated Regime in the Occupied Palestinian territories*, September 2006. Available at: <http://www.badil.org>. See also OCHA Special Focus, *The Barrier Gate and Permit Regime Four Years On: Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank*, November 2007. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_SpecialFocus_BarrierGates_2007_11.pdf


access to income and/or basic services are factors that force families to leave their homes. The findings below also confirm that while house demolitions are the most significant individual displacement trigger, others factors such as loss of income and sources of livelihood, and concerns for personal safety and security lead to displacement of families.

A. Change in place of residence since 2000

Approximately half of all respondents living in HRAs reported that they have changed their residence either permanently or temporarily⁴¹ since the year 2000. This is significantly higher than the 15% of respondents among the general population who changed residence during the same period. When these numbers are broken down by geographic area, it emerges that the highest movement levels were reported in the Gaza HRAs, where 71% of the population reports temporarily or permanently changing residence. This high movement level may be attributable to the three-week Israeli military offensive in Gaza during December 2008 and January 2009, as well as other Israeli incursions into the Gaza border areas.

Respondents were also asked to identify the primary reason for changing their residence since the year 2000. Although they were provided a range of causes, respondents were asked to select a single primary cause. For the overwhelming majority of respondents who changed their residence since 2000, the primary reason related to the policies and practices of the Israeli occupation. In HRAs, respondents who had changed residence had done so because their homes were completely destroyed or damaged⁴² (47%), due to physical insecurity (23%), as a result of Israeli eviction, house demolition or land confiscation orders or 'Israeli orders' (11%), or because of inadequate shelter (8%), which includes lack of services such as electricity and running water. The research considers these respondents to have been displaced. The primary reason that people changed their residence in HRAs was destruction or damage of the family's home (47%).

Figure 14: Change in place of residence since 2000



⁴¹Temporary displacement simply means the family has returned to where their place of habitual residence is or was located. It does not imply that the family is no longer considered to be internally displaced nor does it imply that a durable solution has been sought and reached.

⁴²In the focus group discussions that took place in 'Atouf village, the main reason families changed their residence was the destruction of their homes in Ras al Ahmar.

Table 13: Change in place of residence since 2000, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes, permanently	11%	14%	9%	12%
Yes, temporarily	20%	57%	4%	6%
No	69%	30%	87%	82%

Figure 15: Primary reason for change in place of residence




Table 14: Primary reason for change in place of residence, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Inadequate shelter ⁴³	15%	5%	11%	3%
Feeling of insecurity	8%	28%	11%	24%
It's the household breadwinner's decision	3%	3%	33%	13%
To join the family	8%	5%	11%	8%
To join people from same town	2%	0%	2%	2%
Social stress / stigma	0%	0%	5%	0%
Damages in the house	8%	5%	8%	17%
Destruction of the house ⁴⁴	23%	48%	3%	13%
Israeli orders ⁴⁵	31%	5%	3%	6%
Other	2%	0%	13%	14%

⁴³Includes lack of access to services such as electricity or running water inside of the structure.

⁴⁴Implies complete destruction of the structure.

⁴⁵Encompasses eviction orders, house demolition orders and land confiscation orders.

Among the population in HRAs that had changed their residence or were displaced, most (44% in the West Bank and 59% in Gaza) remained within the same community where their original home was located. In the West Bank HRAs, one-quarter of respondents stated that they remained on the site of their destroyed or damaged home compared with 10% of respondents in Gaza HRAs. In Gaza HRAs, it appears that displaced families moved in with relatives or other host families in greater numbers than in West Bank HRAs. In addition, among respondents who left their home communities, those living in Gaza HRAs were more likely to move within the same district (27%) whereas those living in West Bank HRAs moved to a different governorate in greater numbers (23%). Figure 16 and Table 15 (below) detail responses.

Figure 16: Current residence compared to place of residence in 2000




Table 15: Current residence compared to place of residence in 2000, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Remained on the site of destroyed /damaged home	25%	10%	16%	26%
Different place in the same community	44%	59%	31%	26%
Different residential area in the same district	8%	27%	41%	37%
Different governorate	23%	4%	12%	11%

Finally, among respondents in HRAs who changed their residence, 47% said that they had left their homes for more than a year and 55% said that they left their homes for a period of one year or less. Within the general population, 76% reported that they have changed residence for longer than one year as illustrated in Figure 17 (below).

A change of residence for a period longer than one year was higher in the West Bank HRAs than in the Gaza HRAs. As shown in Table 16 (below), 68% of those who changed residence in West Bank HRAs left their homes for more than one year. The proportion in Gaza was 38%. In the general sample, the proportion of those who changed residence for more than a year in the West Bank was 79% compared with 70% in Gaza. The Israeli military operations in Gaza during December 2008 and January 2009 are the likely explanation for the high levels of short-term displacement in Gaza⁴⁶. In the West Bank on the

⁴⁶With regards to the protection response, families who have returned to the site of their destroyed homes are still considered to be vulnerable and eligible for assistance. From a vulnerability perspective, and for the purposes of this research, these families would be considered as displaced.

other hand, land confiscation, construction of the Separation Wall, and building restrictions have all led to longer term displacement.

Figure 17: Duration of presence in current residence




Table 16: Duration of presence in current residence, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
More than a year	68%	38%	79%	70%
A year	18%	13%	13%	9%
Less than a year	12%	21%	1%	5%
Six months	0%	21%	1%	4%
Three months or less	2%	7%	6%	12%

B. Desire to move and reason

The survey also assessed respondent's desire to move and, if they wanted to move, the reasons why. When asked whether they are considering changing their place of residence in the coming period, 28% of HRA respondents and 21% of the general sample respondents answered affirmatively. The highest levels of those desiring to move were among Gaza's HRA respondents (36%), compared to 21% of the West Bank's HRA respondents. A higher percentage of the general population in Gaza (29%) expressed a desire to move than from either the HRAs or the general population of the West Bank.

During the Israeli military offensive in January 2009, 17% of cultivated land was completely destroyed⁴⁷.

Taking direct war damage and the expanded "buffer zone" together, an estimated 46% of agricultural land has been put out of production⁴⁸.

Since the end of the Israeli military offensive in January 2009, the UN estimates five children have been killed and six injured in incidents involving Israeli gun and tank fire in areas near the border⁴⁹.

⁴⁷United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip Following the Escalation of Hostilities in December 2008 - January 2009*, September 2009. Available at http://www.unep.org/PDF/dmb/UNEP_Gaza_EA.pdf

⁴⁸EU report - needs citation

⁴⁹UN OCHA, Protection of Civilians Database. See <http://www.ochaopt.org/> for more information.

Figure 18: Considering a change in place of residence




Table 17: Considering a change in place of residence, according to population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	21%	36%	18%	29%
No	79%	64%	82%	71%

The reasons why respondents desire to move emphasize the importance of the findings from the first section of the report. In the West Bank HRAs the primary reason why respondents wanted to move was because of lack of access to basic services (36%). In the Gaza HRAs, 42% of respondents wished to move out of concerns for physical security and an additional 42% out of a desire for permanent stability. In this study 'permanent stability' implies living in an environment free of obstacles and difficulties such as those resulting from or related to the Israeli occupation. Both a desire for permanent stability and security concerns are more pronounced in Gaza HRAs compared with West Bank HRAs where respondents answered 26% and 21% respectively. See Figure 19 and Table 18 (below) for detail.

Figure 19: Primary reason for wanting to change place of residence





Table 18: Primary reason for wanting to change place of residence, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
For physical security and comfort	21%	42%	29%	52%
For permanent stability	26%	42%	25%	22%
Economic situation/Employment	13%	2%	27%	15%
Lack of sufficient services in the current place	36%	7%	5%	2%
Other	4%	7%	14%	9%

Impact of job loss on place of residence

Report findings also indicate that job loss is a significant displacement trigger, particularly in HRAs.⁵⁰ Approximately 38% of the HRA respondents who reported losing their jobs since the year 2000 said that they changed their place of residence as a result. The results also indicate that job loss impacted residents of Gaza HRAs (42%) more so than residents of West Bank HRAs (34%).

Figure 20: Impact of job loss on place of residence



⁵⁰While outside the scope of this study, there is considerable evidence to demonstrate a relationship between the high rate of land ownership and dependence on agricultural or livestock activity for primary and secondary income sources in the HRAs, the loss of access to that land, and job loss, with all of these factors collectively contributing to displacement.

Table 19: Impact of job loss on place of residence, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Changed place of residence	34%	42%	9%	14%
Considered changing place of residence, but could not	33%	48%	23%	25%
No effect at all	33%	10%	67%	62%

C. House demolition orders

As noted previously in Section A, house demolition was identified as the most significant displacement trigger among respondents in HRAs accounting for 41% of families who changed their residence since the year 2000. In Gaza HRAs, this was even more pronounced where 48% of respondents cited destruction of their home to be the primary reason behind their change in residence.

The context in which house demolitions takes place differs between the West Bank and Gaza. Since Israel's redeployment of troops to the Gaza periphery in 2005, no so-called administrative house demolitions (for lack of building permit) have been carried out in Gaza. All current house demolitions in Gaza occur in the context of military operations and in most cases happen without any prior warning. By contrast, house demolitions in the West Bank are almost always conducted for so-called administrative reasons and demolition orders are issued prior to the demolition of the home. In some cases, houses are demolished in the West Bank in the context of land-clearing operations for construction of the Separation Wall.

The survey indicates a significance difference between those respondents who received house demolition orders in HRAs (23%) compared with those in the general population (8%). Regarding the stark differences between the numbers of respondents reporting receipt of house demolition orders in the HRAs as compared to the general population, it should be noted that the general population survey included a higher proportion of respondents living in areas A and B of the West Bank which are under PA planning authority or Palestinian-controlled areas of Gaza. In these areas the Israeli Civil Administration cannot issue house demolition orders. Receipt of demolition orders is therefore almost exclusively an issue in Area C of the West Bank.

In June 2009, a combined 92 structures, including residential tents, were demolished in four Jordan Valley communities. The demolitions displaced 148 individuals, including 75 children, and affected an additional 93 individuals, including 65 children⁵¹.

⁵¹Data provided by the Displacement Working Group. For more information, see <http://www.ochaopt.org/>

Figure 21: Respondents who received house demolition orders or lost a home due to the Separation Wall or “buffer zone” policies since the Oslo agreement (1993)






Table 20: Respondents who received house demolition orders or lost a home due to the Separation Wall or “buffer zone” policies since the Oslo agreement (1993), according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	24%	23%	4%	13%
No	71%	75%	96%	87%
Loss due to the Separation Wall	6%	0%	0%	0%
Loss due to the “buffer zone”	0%	2%	0%	0%

D. Desire to return to previous home

Despite the vulnerabilities and fears associated with life in HRAs, more than two-thirds of respondents who have changed their residence since the year 2000 desire to return to their previous home. As noted in Table 28 (below), this is true for respondents in both West Bank and Gaza HRAs. This may be in part due to the reality that as hard as life can be in HRAs, once a family does move, life often becomes even harder.

Figure 22: Desire to return to the previous home




Table 21: Desire to return to the previous home, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	43%	30%
No	29%	19%
Maybe	5%	10%
Yes, but we can't	24%	41%

E. Summary

The findings of this section confirm that there are multiple triggers for displacement in the OPT including but not limited to house demolitions, loss of income or livelihood, concern for personal safety and lack of access to services. Since 2000, approximately half of HRA respondents changed their residence, of which 89% were displaced as a direct result of Israeli policies or practices. House demolition was the most significant trigger for displacement with loss of income or sources of livelihood as a second major cause. In Gaza, concerns for personal safety and security caused families to be displaced while in the West Bank, Israeli military orders and lack of access to services forced families to leave their homes.

The results also validate the designation of the HRAs themselves. On all counts HRA respondents reported higher incidents of displacement and greater vulnerability to displacement pressures.

Overall it appears that the scope of the problem is quite significant, given the tens of thousands of families estimated to be living in the HRAs. These findings emphasize the importance of the ongoing efforts to develop a coordinated inter-agency response to prevent forced displacement, and to assist families following their displacement. These findings also underscore the need for durable solutions as two-thirds of HRA respondents have changed residence but want to return to their previous homes.

Participants from focus group discussions in al Jiftlik and 'Atouf villages stated they had moved to their current homes as a result of house demolitions in their previous area of residence. Both groups referenced ongoing house demolitions in their current areas of residence. Some residents in 'Atouf who had moved to the area following the demolition of their homes stated that they had lost their homes a second time since moving to 'Atouf. These families, however wish to remain in 'Atouf despite the ongoing threats of demolition. Other 'Atouf residents also reported restrictions on their freedom of movement imposed by the Israeli military during incursions into their village.


VIII. Other Vulnerabilities and Factors Related to Displacement

The following section outlines additional factors that contribute to the vulnerability of families living in HRAs including land confiscation and movement and access restrictions. The profile of surveyed households presented in Section VI of this report indicated more than half of respondents own land and a sizeable number rely on it for their livelihood. The primary source of income for families living in HRAs is agriculture. The research also indicated that loss of income source or livelihood is a common trigger for displacement in HRAs. While the research does not make the correlation between land confiscation, loss of livelihood and resultant displacement, the profile of households surveyed would allow for the assumption that land confiscation adds to the vulnerability of these families. Similarly, movement and access restrictions prevent farmers in HRAs from marketing their goods further adding to the vulnerability of these already poor and marginalized families.

A. Land confiscation

As previously mentioned in Section VI of the report, 51% of respondents in HRAs own land (58% in the West Bank and 42% in Gaza). Land confiscation orders and loss of land is greater in HRAs compared with the OPT more generally. Since the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, 29% of respondents in HRAs have received land confiscation orders and an additional 7% had already lost their land as a result of the Separation Wall and “buffer zone” policy. Land confiscation appeared to be more prevalent in West Bank HRAs where 39% of respondents had received land confiscation orders and 11% had already lost their land as compared to 17% and 2% respectively in Gaza HRAs.

Figure 23: Respondents who received land confiscation orders or lost land due to the Separation Wall or “buffer zone” policies since the Oslo agreement (1993)







Table 22: Respondents who received land confiscation orders or lost land due to the Separation Wall or “buffer zone” policies since the Oslo agreement(1993), according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	39%	17%	12%	5%
No	50%	81%	85%	95%
Loss due to the Separation Wall	11%	0%	3%	0%
Loss due to the “buffer zone”	0%	2%	0%	1%

Between 2000 and 2004, in the southern Gaza town of Rafah, more than 10% of the population (16,000 Palestinians) was displaced by house demolition in the creation of the Philadelphi Corridor. Most of the affected families are refugees who were displaced for a second or third time⁵².

⁵²Human Rights Watch, *Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip*, October 2004. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/rafah1004/rafah1004text.pdf>

B. Movement and access restrictions, and impact


In 2007, the World Bank observed that, “freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm.”⁵³

Impact of the Separation Wall and “buffer zone”

The Separation Wall in the West Bank and the “buffer zone” in Gaza have had far reaching implications for the movement and access of Palestinians in HRAs and among the general population although restrictions have impacted residents in HRAs more severely. Eighty-five percent of HRA respondents and 57% respondents from the general population reported that they are directly affected by movement and access restrictions as a result of the Separation Wall or the Gaza “buffer zone”. In both the West Bank and Gaza, HRA respondents reported impacts on movement and access at similar levels, 84% and 85% respectively.

However, responses among the general population differed remarkably, with 75% of respondents from Gaza stating their movement and access is directly impacted by the “buffer zone”, compared with 47% of West Bank respondents stating the same for the Separation Wall. This may be attributable to several factors. First, because of the fragmentation of areas in the West Bank due to checkpoints, road blocks, restricted roads, etc., many respondents in the West Bank may be indirectly impacted by the Separation Wall and directly impacted by other internal movement and access restrictions. In Gaza, where there are no similar internal restrictions, restrictions affecting access to border areas and border crossings may be more widely felt. Secondly, in Gaza, “buffer zone” restrictions extend into every Governorate in a small geographic land area with a high population density, causing its impacts to be more widely felt.

Figure 24: Respondents directly impacted by movement and access restrictions as a result of the Separation Wall or “buffer zone”



⁵³World Bank, Executive Summary - *Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy*, 9 May 2007.

Table 23: Respondents directly impacted by movement and access restrictions as a result of the Separation Wall or “buffer zone”, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	84%	85%	47%	75%
No	16%	15%	53%	25%

Property behind the Separation Wall or within the “buffer zone”

In HRAs, 41% of respondents own land behind the Separation Wall or within the “buffer zone”, compared with 16% among the general population. In the West Bank HRAs, 50% of respondents said their land was located behind the Separation Wall, and 30% of respondents in Gaza HRAs stated their land was located within the “buffer zone”. As noted previously in Section VI, 51% of respondents in HRAs owned land compared with 32% among the general population with higher levels of land ownership in the West Bank compared with Gaza. The population in HRAs, in particular in the West Bank, are therefore more likely to be impacted by Israeli policies that restrict their access to land. As such, only 6% of respondents in the general sample in Gaza own land within the “buffer zone” while 21% of respondents in the West Bank general sample own land behind the Separation Wall.

Figure 25: Respondents owning land behind the Separation Wall or in the “buffer zone”




Table 24: Respondents owning land behind the Separation Wall or in the “buffer zone”, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	50%	30%	21%	6%
No	50%	70%	79%	94%

Access to properties behind the Separation Wall or within the “buffer zone”

Of the respondents in both target groups who own land behind the Separation Wall or within the “buffer zone”, 60% cannot access those lands at all and less than 10% of the respondents said they can reach them easily. In West Bank HRAs, 68% of respondents cannot reach their land behind the Separation Wall and in Gaza HRAs, 55% of respondents cannot reach their land within the “buffer zone”.

Figure 26: Access to properties behind the Separation Wall or in the “buffer zone”




Table 25: Access to properties behind the Separation Wall or in the “buffer zone”, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Very easily	0%	2%	2%	6%
Easily	4%	5%	0%	12%
With difficulty	5%	6%	7%	6%
Very difficult	23%	32%	32%	12%
Can't reach it	68%	55%	59%	64%

General movement restrictions

Fifty-five percent of HRA respondents and 37% of general sample respondents reported that their household's primary income earner faced at least one obstacle on their way to work. In the West Bank, checkpoints were cited as the most common obstacle (38%). As of the end of October 2009, there were a total of 578 closure obstacles inside the West Bank (excluding Green Line crossings), including 69 permanently staffed checkpoints, 21 'partial checkpoints', and 488 unstaffed obstacles⁵⁴. The most cited movement restriction in Gaza HRAs and the second most cited restriction in West Bank HRAs is passing through security and military areas (15% for West Bank and HRAs respectively). Movement restrictions severely impact both adults and children: they obstruct Palestinian access to agricultural and grazing lands, water resources, and impede travel to and from work and markets; children must pass through checkpoints in order to access schools and health services.

Internal movement restrictions have the most impact on West Bank residents, with 43% of the general population and 38% of the population in HRAs reporting difficulties in accessing their workplace as a result of checkpoints. In Gaza, internal movement is relatively easier; however the ongoing Israeli blockade (which began in June 2007) has made travel outside Gaza all but impossible for residents. As stated in Section VI above, Erez Crossing has been closed to all Palestinians since 12 June 2007 except for a limited number of individuals who have obtained special permits in order to exit⁵⁵. In addition, Rafah Crossing between Gaza and Egypt has been closed for public use since 10 June 2007⁵⁶.

Movement restrictions are also severe in the Gaza “buffer zone”. The Israeli military has distributed thousands of leaflets warning Palestinians that if they approach within 300 meters of the border, they risk being fired upon. However, in reality, the “buffer zone” can extend anywhere up to 2 kilometers at its widest point in the North. Nearly all of the restrictions on movement reported by respondents in Gaza relate either to the “buffer zone” or to crossing points into Israel. This is due in part because restrictions on fishing areas off the coast of Gaza in the Mediterranean were not considered for this survey.

⁵⁴OCHA, *West Bank Movement and Access Update*, November 2009. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_access_2009_november_english.pdf

⁵⁵OCHA, *Report No. 97 Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access and Update on Gaza Crossings*, 22 July - 04 August 2009. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_access_movement_agreement_no97_english.pdf

⁵⁶OCHA, *Report No. 97 Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access and Update on Gaza Crossings*, 22 July - 04 August 2009. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_access_movement_agreement_no97_english.pdf

Figure 27: Obstacles confronting breadwinners on their way to work




Table 26: Obstacles confronting breadwinners on their way to work, according to target population and place of residence

WEST BANK		
	HRAs	General Sample
Check points	38%	43%
Crossing through the Separation Wall	3%	3%
Harassment from settlers	8%	2%
Bypass roads	3%	2%
Passing through security and military areas	15%	0%
Nothing	34%	48%
GAZA		
	HRAs	General Sample
Inability to pass through crossing points	3%	7%
Inability to access "buffer zone"	6%	1%
Harassment from Israeli soldiers	1%	0%
Closed roads	12%	0%
Passing through security and military areas	15%	1%
Nothing	63%	91%

Access to land and agricultural areas

Farmers and herders are two of the groups most severely impacted by movement restrictions. This is especially true of farmers and herders residing in HRAs, although respondents among the general sample report difficulties as well.

Fifty-eight percent of the 132 landowning households who responded to the relevant question (from a total of 137 landowning households in the West Bank HRAs sample) reported that they face obstacles working their land. The corresponding figure for Gaza's 83 landowning households who responded (out of a total of 98 landowning households in Gaza's HRAs sample) is 74%. The most common obstacle faced by respondents in West Bank HRAs are checkpoints and in Gaza HRAs, restrictions related to the "buffer zone". These results are further detailed in Table 27 (below).

Children in al Jiftlik and 'Atouf face many obstacles going to school because of long distances and lack of available transportation. This is a serious problem for them especially during the hot summer and cold winter months. (NEC focus group discussion)

Figure 28: Obstacles confronting land-owning families working in the field




Table 27: Obstacles confronting land-owning families working in the field, according to target population and place of residence

WEST BANK		
	HRAs	General Sample
Checkpoints	19%	17%
Crossing through the Separation Wall	8%	9%
Harassment from settlers	16%	7%
Bypass roads	4%	3%
Passing through security and military areas	11%	3%
Nothing	42%	60%
GAZA		
	HRAs	General Sample
Inability to pass through crossing points	4%	4%
Inability to access areas in the "buffer zone"	29%	0%
Harassment from Israeli soldiers	17%	0%
Closed roads	8%	0%
Passing through security and military areas	16%	6%
Nothing	27%	90%

Marketing of goods

In addition to restricting people's access to services, sources of income, and land, Israeli-imposed movement restrictions also have serious impacts on Palestinian commerce. Farmers and entrepreneurs cannot easily market their goods, purchase materials or equipment necessary for the maintenance of their businesses and/or ensure proper care of produce or products. In HRAs, only 7% of the respondents stated that they are able to market their goods without obstacles⁵⁷. More than 30% said that they are not able to distribute or market their goods and more than 40% said the distribution or marketing of goods is very difficult. In Gaza, the situation is worse. As outlined in Table 28 (below), 33% of Gaza's general sample respondents and 46% of HRA respondents said that they are not able to distribute their goods. This is almost certainly related to the ongoing Israeli blockade, which has (with only a few minor exceptions) completely halted exports from Gaza. In the West Bank the corresponding numbers are 14% and 20% respectively for the general population and HRAs.

In West Bank HRAs, 52% of the 123 households who own land and responded to the relevant question (out of a total of 137 landowning households in the West Bank HRAs sample) are able to market their goods. In Gaza's HRAs, of the 89 land-owning households who responded to the relevant question (out of 98 landowning households in the Gaza HRAs sample), only 43% are able to market their goods.

⁵⁷These percentages do not account for agricultural products that are produced strictly for household use.

Figure 29: Marketing of goods as impacted by movement and access restrictions




Table 28: Marketing of goods as impacted by movement and access restrictions, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Distribution of goods without obstacles	4%	11%	34%	40%
Distribution of goods with some obstacles	29%	8%	29%	7%
The distribution of goods is very difficult	47%	34%	23%	20%
Not able to distribute the goods	20%	46%	14%	33%

C. Summary

Given the profile of households surveyed in HRAs, the Israeli practices of land confiscation and movement and access restrictions further contribute to the vulnerability of these families placing them at even greater risk of displacement. While the research could not correlate the data between land confiscation and/or movement and access restrictions, loss of livelihood and resultant displacement, the data supports the conclusion that these are factors contributing to the vulnerability of families to forced displacement.

According to the survey, nearly one-third of high risk area respondents said that they have received land confiscation orders since 1993, compared with 9% in the rest of the OPT. In the West Bank alone, 39% of respondents said they had received land confiscation orders during this same period.

In the West Bank, 58% of families in high risk areas own land. Half of all households in high risk areas stated that their land was located behind the Separation Wall; 68% cannot access their land as a result. Movement restrictions and checkpoints also restricted respondents' ability to market agricultural goods with 96% of surveyed respondents in high risk areas stating they either faced difficulty marketing goods or could not market their goods at all.

In Gaza, 42% of families in high risk areas own land. One-third of all households in high risk areas stated that their land was located within the “buffer zone”; 55% cannot access their land as a result. In addition, 88% of households surveyed in areas near the “buffer zone” either faced difficulty marketing goods or could not market their goods at all.

IX. Impacts and Coping Mechanisms

Displacement can have devastating impacts on communities, families and children. Although much of what is known relates to the impacts of house demolitions specifically, this knowledge also informs our understanding of general displacement impacts as well. One of the most serious findings of a previous Save the Children UK research on the impacts of house demolitions is the link between demolitions and the onset of trauma-related symptoms as well as the development of mental health disorders such as anxiety and depression. House demolitions were found to cause long periods of instability, disruption of family life, and worsening socio-economic conditions. On average, families who had lost their homes took at least two years to find a permanent place of residence.

In addition to these previously demonstrated impacts, this research reveals that families face worsening socio-economic and psychosocial conditions as well as decreased access to services and poor assistance following displacement, regardless of the reason why they were displaced. In the West Bank in particular, the survey indicated that access to basic services is worse than in Gaza following displacement, yet assistance is less available as compared with Gaza. Overall, the survey demonstrates that coping strategies are dwindling or have largely been exhausted and make clear that the humanitarian community must do more to comprehensively address the needs of families who have been displaced.

Impacts on Children

Education

- In high risk areas, 45% of respondents said that education services were ‘available’ and 50% responded ‘somewhat available’ compared with 62% and 30% respectively among the general population.
- 20% of respondents in high risk areas stated that the availability of education services was ‘worse’ following a displacement event compared with the majority of respondents who stated there was ‘no change.’
- House demolition has been identified as the most common displacement trigger for families living in high risk areas in the OPT. Following a house demolition, Save the Children’s

Layth (5 years) is one of 23 children who attend Bara'im kindergarten, which is supported by Save the Children UK's ECHO-funded displacement project. If not for this program, these 23 children would not be able to attend kindergarten due to long distances and the inability of poor families to afford transportation.

“Layth spends five hours every day, except Fridays, at kindergarten. It has been a while now since he started to attend and I have seen a significant difference in his development. My son was shy before, but now, after interacting regularly with other children, he has become more confident and I can see that he is talking much more than before.”

-Hiyam, Layth's mother in al Jiftlik, Jordan Valley

research⁵⁸ has shown a decline in children's educational achievement and ability to study.

Poverty

- 33% of respondents from high risk areas in the West Bank and Gaza have sent their children to work at least a few times as a means of maintaining living standards following a displacement event.

Psychosocial status

- 75% of the respondents in the HRAs report feeling depressed compared with 56% of the general population.
- The psychological state of parents has a major impact on the children's mental health, especially for children under 12 years⁵⁹.
- Children whose houses have been demolished show a decline in their mental health, suffering classic signs of trauma, becoming withdrawn, depressed and anxious⁶⁰.

A. Availability of services after displacement

As outlined previously, access to basic services and availability of basic necessities is restricted or insufficient in many areas of the OPT, most particularly in the HRAs⁶¹. This research demonstrates that following a displacement event, access to basic services and necessities deteriorates. The research also reveals notable differences between the situations faced by displaced families in the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, for example, very few respondents reported an improvement in their situation following a displacement event and the majority (between 42% and 63%) reported worsening conditions following displacement.

In Gaza, around 20 – 30% of respondents stated that their access to services and basic necessities actually improved after a displacement event, with most dramatic improvements demonstrated in personal security (45%), freedom of movement (46%), and economic situation (42%). There are several possible explanations for this. First, families living near the Gaza "buffer zone" are much more likely to receive assistance from UNRWA, international, or local organizations both before and after displacement events as outlined in the conclusion below, which would alleviate the family economic situation in the short term.⁶² Second, Gaza residents face fewer restrictions overall in rebuilding their homes and/or connecting to basic services unlike the HRAs of the West Bank. However, nearly one-third

⁵⁸ Save the Children UK, *Broken Homes: Addressing the Impact of House Demolitions on Palestinian Children and Families*, June 2009. Available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/54_8431.htm

⁵⁹ See Save the Children UK 'Broken Homes' report.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Most HRAs do not have kindergartens, schools, and health centers. Residents routinely travel long distances for education and medical care.

⁶² This finding may be directly affected by the recent Israeli offensive in January 2009 and the massive influx of humanitarian assistance into Gaza. More study would be needed to determine if the economic improvements for the family are longer term.

of all respondents displaced in Gaza report long-term deterioration in their living situation. These results underscore the need for a much improved inter-agency response to displacement.

Figure 30: The availability of the following in your area of residence (HRA only)





Table 29: Quality of life indicators, comparison following displacement

		HRAs	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip
Food	Better than before	12%	29%
	No change	31%	36%
	Worse than before	57%	34%
Water	Better than before	8%	31%
	No change	30%	54%
	Worse than before	62%	15%
Education	Better than before	8%	19%
	No change	50%	74%
	Worse than before	42%	7%
Health	Better than before	12%	24%
	No change	31%	56%
	Worse than before	57%	20%
Physical security	Better than before	18%	45%
	No change	24%	19%
	Worse than before	59%	36%
Freedom of movement	Better than before	18%	46%
	No change	18%	24%
	Worse than before	63%	29%
Sanitation system	Better than before	6%	19%
	No change	33%	52%
	Worse than before	61%	29%
Economic security	Better than before	13%	42%
	No change	25%	35%
	Worse than before	63%	23%

B. Impact of displacement on income and poverty

In general, there are significant differences in income distribution between HRAs and the general population irrespective of whether displacement events did or did not occur. Households located in the HRAs reported lower earnings than households in the general sample.⁶³ Following displacement, income levels declined in all areas, but the income of HRA respondents and general sample respondents differed significantly. For example, while 12% of HRA respondents reported that they earned more than 5,000 NIS per month prior to being displaced, following displacement this dropped to just 3%. Within the general population, 18% earned more than 5000 NIS per month, with a similar fall to 11%. This research also demonstrates that, while the impact of displacement is significant in Gaza, proportionally, the negative impact of displacement on income levels was greater in HRAs of the West Bank, despite the fact that the socioeconomic situation in Gaza is generally more severe than in the West Bank. Overall, displacement events are shown to increase poverty levels across all areas of the OPT.

Figure 31: Household monthly income before and after displacement



⁶³About 10% of the respondents from the general public were found to be internally displaced. The income distribution in the tables below for the general population that relates to period prior to displacement covers only this sector of the general population.

Table 30: Household monthly income before and after displacement, according to target population and place of residence

		HRAs		OPT	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Before Displacement	NIS 5000 and over	11%	13%	24%	12%
	Between NIS 4500-4999	1%	3%	9%	6%
	Between NIS 4000-4499	2%	1%	8%	6%
	Between NIS 3500-3999	11%	1%	6%	6%
	Between NIS 3000-3499	21%	3%	14%	14%
	Between NIS 2500-2999	11%	7%	9%	13%
	Between NIS 2000-2499	15%	17%	12%	13%
	Between NIS 1500-1999	13%	22%	11%	13%
	Between NIS 500-999	13%	17%	1%	6%
	Less than NIS 500	2%	16%	5%	11%
Current income	NIS 5000 and over	2%	3%	13%	7%
	Between NIS 4500-4999	3%	2%	3%	3%
	Between NIS 4000-4499	4%	0%	6%	5%
	Between NIS 3500-3999	3%	1%	4%	6%
	Between NIS 3000-3499	2%	3%	11%	10%
	Between NIS 2500-2999	10%	5%	10%	10%
	Between NIS 2000-2499	16%	11%	17%	13%
	Between NIS 1500-1999	21%	17%	14%	13%
	Between NIS 1000-1499	14%	11%	11%	9%
	Between NIS 500-999	16%	19%	4%	9%
Less than NIS 500	9%	28%	7%	15%	

C. Coping Mechanisms and Response Strategies

Given the challenges faced by respondents in all parts of the OPT, the survey asked questions about coping strategies used by families to maintain their living standards. While a majority of general sample respondents said that they did not need to rely on coping strategies to maintain their living standards, in HRAs coping strategies such as receiving assistance from organizations, reliance on social support networks, and selling property and belongings, were used more extensively. However, respondents in HRAs indicated that coping strategies are either dwindling or are not available. The study also revealed differences in available coping mechanisms between HRAs in Gaza and the West Bank, with fewer assistance channels available to residents of West Bank HRAs. These findings highlight the need for more rigorous prevention strategies and overall support to these families to prevent their slide into further poverty, with a targeted focus on HRAs in the West Bank.

For example, in HRAs in the West Bank, a notable number of respondents said that assistance was not available from either local organizations (53%) or international organizations (49%). In Gaza HRAs however, the percentage of respondents who stated that assistance was not available was much lower for both local organizations (3%) and international organizations (12%). Strikingly, 40% of respondents from HRAs in the West Bank have sent their children to work at least a few times and about 75% have reduced their standards of living in order to cope with their situation.

Figure 32: Use of assistance in the past and type of assistance received




Table 31: Use of assistance in the past and type of assistance received, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Have you received assistance from a local organization?				
All the time	1%	22%	0%	3%
Most of the time	4%	24%	3%	8%
Half of the time	5%	8%	1%	3%
Few times	13%	21%	8%	12%
It is exhausted	11%	4%	0%	1%
Not available	53%	3%	28%	22%
No need to use it	13%	17%	58%	50%
Have you received assistance from an international organization?				
All the time	2%	19%	0%	2%
Most of the time	4%	21%	1%	7%
Half of the time	7%	8%	2%	5%
Few times	12%	17%	10%	18%
It is exhausted	8%	4%	1%	2%
Not available	49%	12%	25%	16%
No need to use it	17%	19%	61%	49%
Have you received assistance from the PNA?				
All the time	1%	10%	0%	1%
Most of the time	6%	9%	4%	8%
Half of the time	7%	6%	2%	1%
Few times	12%	12%	10%	13%
It is exhausted	13%	6%	1%	1%
Not available	44%	32%	22%	21%
No need to use it	16%	26%	62%	54%
Have you received assistance from family and friends?				
All the time	9%	22%	1%	4%
Most of the time	17%	24%	7%	12%
Half of the time	11%	11%	6%	8%
Few times	20%	21%	20%	21%
It is exhausted	10%	4%	1%	2%
Not available	23%	3%	9%	6%
No need to use it	10%	15%	55%	47%
Have you established cooperatives to facilitate marketing and sales?				
All the time	8%	3%	0%	0%

Most of the time	15%	12%	2%	2%
Half of the time	14%	6%	2%	2%
Few times	11%	16%	4%	8%
It is exhausted	5%	4%	1%	1%
Not available	31%	31%	15%	16%
No need to use it	16%	28%	75%	72%

Have you sent children to work?

All the time	4%	4%	0%	1%
Most of the time	10%	10%	2%	5%
Half of the time	10%	3%	4%	3%
Few times	16%	11%	10%	8%
It is exhausted	3%	0%	0%	1%
Not available	28%	21%	17%	12%
No need to use it	29%	52%	68%	70%

Have you sold property/ jewelry?

All the time	0%	3%	1%	3%
Most of the time	4%	8%	4%	8%
Half of the time	2%	11%	4%	7%
Few times	5%	16%	17%	16%
It is exhausted	6%	10%	5%	7%
Not available	42%	16%	18%	15%
No need to use it	42%	36%	51%	45%

Have you reduced your living standard?

All the time	11%	13%	14%	23%
Most of the time	23%	32%	27%	31%
Half of the time	18%	18%	14%	12%
Few times	22%	21%	23%	13%
It is exhausted	4%	0%	0%	0%
Not available	9%	2%	2%	2%
No need to use it	14%	13%	21%	20%

Have you borrowed from any one?

All the time	14%	23%	4%	9%
Most of the time	27%	33%	15%	19%
Half of the time	11%	10%	11%	11%
Few times	22%	17%	34%	25%
It is exhausted	2%	0%	1%	1%
Not available	6%	3%	1%	2%
No need to use it	17%	14%	33%	33%


In addition to the coping mechanisms discussed above, families at risk of displacement may also seek legal assistance to challenge house demolition, eviction, or land confiscation orders. Communities facing pressure due to a lack of building permits and access to basic services can put forward challenges for services and permits. However, the majority of respondents in both HRAs and within the general population said that they have not received any legal assistance to challenge displacement threats. As noted in Table 32 (below), of the respondents living in HRAs, only 35% of those who received house demolition orders and 21% of those who received land confiscation orders since the 1993 reported receiving legal assistance. General sample respondents gave similar responses.

Table 32: Use of legal assistance in response to threat of home demolition or land confiscation

		Since the Oslo agreement, did you receive any threat of demolition of the house?			Since the Oslo agreement, did you get any land confiscation threat?		
		Yes	No	Loss due to the wall/"buffer zone"	Yes	No	Loss due to the wall/"buffer zone"
Getting legal assistance (HRA)	Yes	35%	7%	19%	21%	26%	15%
	No	65%	93%	81%	79%	74%	85%
Getting legal assistance (OPT)	Yes	23%	11%	0%	16%	0%	13%
	No	77%	89%	0%	84%	0%	88%

Among those respondents in HRAs who did not receive legal assistance after receiving house demolition orders (65%) and land confiscation orders (79%), several reasons were cited. Nearly half of all HRA respondents (48%) said that they did not know where to seek legal assistance and 46% of HRA respondents said that they did not seek legal assistance because they had lost hope that legal action would make a difference. Very few respondents (5%) said that financial constraints stopped them from receiving legal assistance. See Figure 33 (below).

Figure 33: Reason for not using legal assistance



Of those HRA respondents who did receive legal assistance, the majority received assistance through the Palestinian Authority (30%) or international organizations (25%). A further 28% financed their own legal action using personal funds and/or assistance from family and friends. Among general sample respondents, the two main sources of legal assistance were the Palestinian Authority and personal resources.

Figure 34: Source of legal assistance




Table 33: Source of assistance, according to target population and place of residence

	HRAs		OPT	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Personal resources	21%	7%	18%	33%
Family and friends	7%	17%	0%	33%
The Palestinian Authority	45%	14%	18%	33%
One of the political groups	3%	17%	9%	0%
NGO	7%	7%	9%	0%
International organization	17%	38%	9%	0%
Others	0%	0%	36%	0%

D. Summary

In an effort to assess the overall impacts of displacement as well as the mechanisms for assistance and coping after displacement occurs, this study asked a series of questions designed to reveal pre- and post-displacement levels of income and access to services, as well as the extent and source of assistance used following the experience of displacement. Income loss and poverty were found to increase following all instances of displacement, and in the West Bank, access to basic services became even less available. Assistance and coping mechanisms were found to be lacking, especially in the West Bank, and a gap in the provision of legal assistance was also found. Significantly, the situation for all families who have changed residence since 2000, including those who have been displaced, has deteriorated, suggesting that vulnerability should be broadly considered in defining who is an IDP (and the response mechanism itself) to ensure that all persons facing significant protection concerns are included in a response.

In al Jiftlik village in the Jordan Valley, focus group participants reported that the only outside assistance they received was from the Red Crescent following the demolition of houses, but according to residents, the Red Crescent was not able to do anything meaningful to help them. In 'Atouf, women reported a need for income-generation projects. Such a project had existed previously but is no longer operational.

X. Conclusion

Though displacement has been a reality for Palestinians over the past six decades, the humanitarian community is only beginning to grasp the multiple factors that trigger displacement and that render particular areas of the occupied Palestinian territory far more vulnerable to displacement risks. Together, multiple factors including policies and practices related to the lack of access to basic services, land confiscation, and movement and access restrictions, unemployment and poverty, concerns for personal safety and security form a complex web of displacement pressures. In the areas of the OPT where house demolitions and forced evictions are highest, these other related displacement pressures and vulnerabilities are also more prevalent.

Communities in HRAs, including the Gaza “buffer zone” and Area C communities (also including the seam zone), fare far worse than Palestinian communities in the rest of the OPT on a range of quality of life indicators.⁶⁴ Higher rates of poverty, unemployment or income loss, poor housing conditions, lack of access to basic services and necessities, and greater levels of physical insecurity and depression all serve to heighten displacement pressures in these areas. This study found for example, that house demolitions are by far the most common reason why Palestinians are displaced, while loss of income source and livelihoods and concerns for personal safety and security also represent key displacement triggers. In addition, Israeli orders, inadequate shelter and lack of access to basic services also influence families' decisions to change residence. In addition, Israeli practices such as land confiscation and movement and access restrictions serve to heighten families' vulnerability to displacement and acts as an additional pressure potentially impacting their decision to change residence. Further, many, if not all, of the quality of life indicators can be linked to displacement triggers and other related factors that increase vulnerability to displacement. However, despite the difficulties and fears associated with life in high risk areas, families are almost always worse off once they are displaced and many desire to return to their homes.


The research also confirms the potentially devastating impacts of displacement on communities, families and children and underscores the need to improve access to and availability of support to households that do experience a displacement event. Communities and households most in need are not being reached and those who do receive assistance are exhausting what little coping mechanisms they have available.

Gaps still remain in the humanitarian community's understanding of displacement. A registration system has yet to be developed to allow for the registration, monitoring and provision of assistance to displaced families. Little is as yet known about where families go after they are displaced, although most anecdotal evidence points to the families staying with extended or host families. There are significant protection concerns for these IDPs, some of which are revealed by this research (such as increased levels of poverty and income loss following displacement and in the West Bank especially, decreased access to basic services and insufficient availability of assistance) and some of which are as yet unconfirmed. There are also concerns that there is no or little support provided to host families to deal with

⁶⁴Again, although East Jerusalem was not included in this survey, the same can be said of this locality as the other high risk areas of the OPT.

the additional burden of caring for displaced family members. The humanitarian community must clarify the needs of this population and seek to address these needs, while also assisting displaced families to realize their rights to rehabilitation and return to their place of residence. The humanitarian community must meet its humanitarian imperative to ensure an adequate response as well as its obligation to address the root causes of displacement and thereby stem the tide of displacement.

Palestinian residents of Imneizil village in South Hebron have been unable to build houses, schools and health clinics nor connect to water or electricity networks because of Israeli military restrictions. Similar restrictions do not exist for Israelis living in Susiya settlement (background). PHOTO/Save the Children



XI. Suggested Response

An inter-agency response to forced displacement should be implemented, through which individual organizations responsible for and with expertise in specific sectors, provide assistance to those who are displaced or at risk of displacement. Such a response would follow the rights-based approach outlined in the UN Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement, while fostering systematic information collection that can benefit both advocacy and litigation efforts. Such a response should also endeavour to address not only the immediate needs of IDPs and those at risk of displacement but their medium and long-term vulnerabilities. Displacement in the OPT is complex and multi-dimensional and it requires a well-coordinated inter-agency response.

Thus, based on the research findings and experience gained through Save the Children UK's forced displacement project funded by the Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission, and in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Save the Children UK recommends a comprehensive, coordinated inter-agency response to forced displacement in the OPT, to include the following four components:

- **Prevention:** development of essential services and infrastructure, livelihoods support, health and education services, vocational training and capacity building, formation of Community Protection Committees, legal aid, psychosocial support and advocacy.
- **Emergency response:** shelter, livestock, water and food provisions, family reunification, legal aid, provision of educational and child recreational kits and mother-and-child psychosocial support; remedial education support, host family support and registration.
- **Rehabilitation:** shelter, livelihoods support, vocational and technical training, counselling and psychosocial care, remedial education support, host family support, identification of long-term solutions, and advocacy.
- **Durable solutions:** return to original location of residence, restitution, compensation, or integration.

As highlighted above, children are especially vulnerable to the negative impacts of life in high risk areas. Their physical security, psychosocial and socio-economic wellbeing, as well as their access to education, basic services, and healthcare are all threatened in high risk areas. Given this heightened vulnerability, children need and deserve special attention, especially following a displacement event. Save the Children UK recommends the following child-focused response:

- **Prevention:** improvement of infrastructure related to education and health access including support for transportation to schools, child participation in Community Protection Committees, dissemination of child rights information, livelihoods programming, psychosocial support and advocacy.
- **Emergency response:** provision of educational supplies and recreational kits, psychosocial support.
- **Rehabilitation:** counselling, educational support or tutoring, safe play activities, vocational and technical training for youth, youth-focused empowerment activities.
- **Durable solutions:** participation in decision making around long-term solutions for the family or community.

XII. Recommendations

Save the Children UK calls for the following steps to protect children and families from forced displacement in the OPT.

State of Israel

- Halt the demolition of Palestinian homes and land confiscation and other related policies that result in displacement.
- Clearly define a policy for the Gaza “buffer zone” that is in line with its international legal obligations related to the protection of civilians under occupation.
- Respect and apply to the OPT the principles of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and relevant Security Council resolutions.
- Ensure access to populations at risk and to people that have been displaced.

Palestinian Authority

- Monitor and document the practice of house demolition and any other form of displacement in the OPT.
- Ensure necessary assistance for the victims of house demolitions and other displaced people, especially children, particularly providing psychological support and necessary referrals.
- Continue to prioritize the issue of Area C and the “buffer zone” and its impacts on residents in these areas, as a key protection and recovery issue.

The International Community

- Advocate for prevention of house demolitions, community evictions, and the mitigation of the “buffer zone” policy in the OPT.
- Monitor and document the practice of house demolition and any other form of displacement in the OPT.
- Develop, implement and mobilize funding for the inter-agency response to internal displacement in the OPT.
- Call upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law vis-à-vis its house demolition, “buffer zone”, and other related policies that result in displacement.

XIII. Annexes

A. Questionnaire in English

Question		Answer						Code
G: Anxiety and despair								
		(5) All the time	(4) Most of the time	(3) More than 1/2 the time	(2) Less than 1/2 the time	(1) some- times	(0) Never	
G1	In the past two weeks, did you feel good spirited?	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	G1
G2	In the past two weeks, did you feel relaxed?	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	G2
G3	In the past two weeks, did you feel energized?	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	G3
G4	In the past two weeks, did you feel healthy?	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	G4
G5	In the past two weeks, did you feel that your life was interesting?	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	G5
A: Information About the Family								
A1	Sex of the household breadwinner	1.Male		2.Female				A1
A2	Age of the household breadwinner	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> years						A2
A3	Marital status of the breadwinner	1.Married 2.Single 3.Engaged 4.Widower 5.Divorced			6.Lost 7.Separated 8.Other 99.DK/NA		A3	
A4	Refugee status of the breadwinner	1. Refugee		2. Non-refugee		99. DK/NA		A4
A5	Residential type	1. UNRWVA 2. The family house 3. Friend's house 4. Uninhabited building 5. A tent over a house's rubble 6. A tent in a refugee camp			7. Partially destroyed house 8. Undamaged house 9. Hosted 10. Other: specify _____ 99.DK/NA			A5
A6	Number of family members with a monthly income?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>						A6
A7	Number of dependent family members?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>						A7
A8	Number of family members including the children and the respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> member						A8
A9	Number of family members above 18 years old.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> member						A9
A10	Number of family members under 18 years old.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> member						A10
: Information about the economic condition of the HH								

E1	What are the two most important income resources for the family? 1.Agriculture 2.Fishing 3.Animal husbandry 4.Daily wage earner 5.Wage/salary from the Palestinian authority. 6.Wage/salary from the UNRWA 7.Wage/salary from an NGO's 8.Wage/salary from an international organization. 9.Wage/salary from private sector 10.Own business 11.Seller 12.Charity 13.Aid from the UNRWA 14.Aid from international organization 15.Aid from Palestinian families 16.Aid from the Palestinian authority 17.Other: specify _____ 99.DK/NA	First resource: <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		E1a
		Second resource: <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		E1b
E2	Work place for the household breadwinner?	1. In the house 2. In the same area of residence 3. In the same district of residential 4. Different district 5. Settlements	6. Israel 7. Retired 8. Other 99.DK/NA	E2
E3	In your area of residence how much of the following is available?			
E3a	Food	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3a
E3b	Water	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3b
E3c	Education	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3c
E3d	Health	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3d
E3e	Security/safety	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3e
E3f	Freedom of movement	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3f
E3g	Sanitation	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3g
E3h	Economic security	1.Available 2.Available to some extent	3. Not available 99.DK / NA	E3h
Israeli violations				
E4	Did the Separation Wall/ "buffer zone" affect your family?	1.Yes 2.No	3.Not applicable 99.DK/NA	E4
E5	Do you have any property/land behind	1.Yes 2.No (move to E7)	99.NA/DK	E5
E6	Can you reach this property?	1.Very easily 2.Easily 3.With difficulty 4.Very difficult	5. Can't reach it 88.Not applicable 99.DK/NA	E6
E7	Is your family thinking about changing its place of residence in the coming period?	1.Yes 2. No (move to question E9) 99.DK/NA		E7
E8	Reasons for wanting to change residence	1. For security and comfort 2. For permanent stability 3. Economic situation/Employment 4.Lack of services in the current place	5.Other 88.Not applicable 99.DK/NA	E8

E9	Obstacles confronting the breadwinner on his/her way to his/her work	1.Check points 2.Crossing the Separation Wall 3. Harassment from settlers 4. Bypass Roads	5. Passing through security and military areas 6.Nothing 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	E9	
E10	Do you own a land?	1.Yes	2. No (GOTO E13)	99.DK/NA	E10
E11	Obstacles confronting land owning family while working in the field	1.Check points 2. Crossing the wall/BZ 3. Harassment from settlers 4. Passing through bypass roads	5. Passing through security and military areas 6.Nothing 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	E11	
E12	If the family owns agricultural land how would you describe marketing your goods in as far as movement is concerned?	1. Without obstacles 2. With some obstacles 3.Product distribution is very difficult	4. Not able to distribute goods 5. For home use 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	E12	
E13	Since the Oslo agreement, did you receive any threats of demolition of the house?	1.Yes 2.No 3. We lost property due to the wall/"buffer zone" 99. DK/NA		E13	
E14	Since the Oslo agreement, did you get any land confiscation threats?	1.Yes 2.No	3. We lost property due to the wall/"buffer zone" 99. DK/NA	E14	
E15	Did you get any legal assistance as a result of these threats?	1.Yes 2. No 88. Not applicable (GOTO ID1) 99. DK/NA		E15	
E16	If the answer was no, what is the reason for not getting any legal assistance?	1. Financial reasons 2. I lost hope 3. I don't know where to ask	4. Other specify..... 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	E16	
E17	If the answer was yes, who offered this assistance?	1. Personal resources 2. Family and friends 3. The authority 4. One of the political groups 5. NGO	6. Int'l organization 7. Other 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	E17	
ID: Information about displacement					
ID1	Have your family changed its place of residence since 2000 (second Intifada)?	1. Yes (permanently) 2. Yes (temporarily)	3. No (move to ID8) 99. DK/NA	ID1	
ID2	How long has the family been in the temporary location?	1. More than year 2. One Year 3. Less than a year 4. Six months	5. Three months or less 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID2	
ID3	What is the main reason for changing your place of residence?	1. Shelter 2. Feeling of insecurity 3. Bread- winner's decision 4. To join the family 5. To join people from same town 6. Social stress / stigma	7. Damages in the house 8. Destruction of the house 9. Economic reasons 10. Israeli orders 11. Other; specify..... 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID3	
ID4	Have all of the family members moved from the place of residence?	1. Yes 2. NO	3. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID4	
ID5	Have all of the family members moved to the same place?	1. Yes 2. NO	99. DK/NA	ID5	

ID6	Current residence compared to the place of residence in 2000	1. Did not change since 2000 2. Different place but in the same community 3. Different residential area in the same district 4. Different governorate 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID6	
ID7	The governorate where the family was residing in 2000	1. Jenin 2. Tubas 3. Nablus 4. Salfit 5. Qalqilya 6. Tulkarem 7. Ramallah 8. Jerusalem 9. Jericho	10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron 12. North Gaza 13. Gaza City 14. Rafah 15. Deir Balah 16. Khan Younis 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID7
ID8	The current governorate of residence	1. Jenin 2. Toubas 3. Nablus 4. Salfit 5. Qalqiliya 6. Tulkarem 7. Ramallah 8. Jerusalem	9. Jericho 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron 12. North Gaza 13. Gaza City 14. Rafah 15. Deir Balah 16. Khan Younis 99. DK/NA	ID8
ID9	Do you still have deeds for the house (the demolished house)?	1. Yes 2. No	88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID9
ID10	Does the family think of going back to the previous house or land (for those who were displaced since 2000)?	1. Yes 2. No 3. Maybe	4. Yes but we can not 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID10
ID11	Give reasons 99. DK/NA	ID11	
ID18	In your current place of residence, are the following available ...(only for High risk areas)		ID18	
ID18a	Food	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18a
ID18b	Water	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18b
ID18c	Education	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18c
ID18d	Health	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18d
ID18e	Security	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18e
ID18f	Freedom of movement	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18f
ID18g	Sanitation	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18g
ID18h	Economic security	1. Available 2. Available to some extent	3. Not available 99. DK / NA	ID18h
ID19	Since 2000, did you loose your job or source of living?	1. yes 2. No (move to ID21) 99. DK/NA	ID19	

ID20	To what extent the loss of your job affected your place of residence?	1. Changed place of residence 2. I thought of changing the place of residence but I could not find an alternative	3. It did not have any effect at all 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID20
ID21	Do you think your family lives in a secure place?	1. Yes 2. No	3. To some extent 99. DK/NA	ID21
ID22	If the answer is no, why do you have the feeling of insecurity in your current residence?	1. Israeli measures 2. Settlers 3. High crime rate 4. Security chaos	5. Internal conflict 6. Other 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	ID22

CS: Coping strategies (only for High risk areas)

Csl In the past month have you Used the following: Csl											
		All the time	Most of the time	Half of the time	Some times	It is Exhausted	Not available	No need to use it	Not applicable	DK/NA	
Csla	Assistance from local orgs.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Csla
Cslb	Assistance from int'l orgs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Cslb
Cslc	PNA assistance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Cslc
Csld	Assistance from family & friends	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Csld
Csle	Creating cooperatives to facilitate marketing and sales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Csle
Cslf	Send children to work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Cslf
Cslg	Sell property/jewellery	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Cslg
Cslh	Reduce living standard	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Cslh
Csli	Borrowing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	99	Csli

DEMOGRAPHICS

D1	Place of residence	1. City 2. Village	3. Refugee camp 99. DK/NA	D1
D2	Household monthly income (please include salaries, dividends, rent, shares, etc...)	1. NIS 5000 and over 2. Between NIS 4500-4999 3. Between NIS 4000-4499 4. Between NIS 3500-3999 5. Between NIS 3000-3499 6. Between NIS 2500-2999 7. Between NIS 2000-2499	8. Between NIS 1500-1999 9. Between NIS 1000-1499 10. Between NIS 500-999 11. Less than NIS 500 99. DK/NA	D2
D3	Household monthly income before displacement (please include salaries, dividends, rent, shares, etc...)	1. NIS 5000 and over 2. Between NIS 4500-4999 3. Between NIS 4000-4499 4. Between NIS 3500-3999 5. Between NIS 3000-3499 6. Between NIS 2500-2999 7. Between NIS 2000-2499	8. Between NIS 1500-1999 9. Between NIS 1000-1499 10. Between NIS 500-999 11. Less than NIS 500 88. Not applicable 99. DK/NA	D3