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# Internally Displaced Persons and Social Settlements in West Darfur

Rapid survey on community organisation in Ardamata, Ryiad  
and Dorti camps, West Darfur

Founded in 1960, Terre des hommes is a Swiss organization which helps to build a better future for disadvantaged children and their communities, with an innovative approach and practical, sustainable solutions. Active in more than 30 countries, Tdh develops and implements field projects to allow a better daily life for over one million children and their close relatives, particularly in the domains of health care and protection. This engagement is financed by individual and institutional support, of which 85% flows directly into the programs of Tdh.



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# Introduction

Tdh has been conducting humanitarian relief operations on the ground in Darfur since 2004. Its activities basically include Protection, assistance to extremely vulnerable refugees, service delivery (NFI distribution), awareness creation (*awareness team*), etc. As the entity responsible for the management of the three camps near Geneina, Tdh embarked in 2008 on a community based approach to the management and coordination of these camps. This approach seeks to involve and facilitate the participation of partners (NGOs, UN agencies, local authorities) and the various segments of the community in the assessment of problems that arise in the camps, as well as in the search for solutions to those problems. Traditional social organization in the camps revolves mainly around one type of political player: the Sheikh. However, change is happening in the social microcosm represented in the camps. For, traditional ways of living and organization are now being adjusted to and combined with the specific conditions in the camps.

The present socio-anthropological research work attempts to provide the keys for gaining a deeper and better understanding of this new form of social organization, and for improving community participation in activities in the camps.



A blue-tinted photograph of a woman in a floral headscarf and dress walking in a village with thatched huts. The scene is set in a rural area with a dirt path and traditional wooden and thatched structures. The woman is in the foreground, walking away from the camera. In the background, other people are visible, and the overall atmosphere is one of a traditional, rural community.

# 1

## Conceptual framework?

The conceptual framework for this survey is oriented towards the socio-anthropological elements that make it possible to understand the sections below and to grasp the overall coherence of the analysis.

## 1. The general context of the survey

Darfur is Sudan's westernmost province. It has a total land surface area of 510'000 km<sup>2</sup>. Darfur lies between latitudes 10 and 16 degrees North and longitudes 22 and 27 degrees East. The population, estimated at five million inhabitants by the 1993 census (Assal, 2007), is considered in more recent estimates (Kim & all, 2007) to be about 6.5 million inhabitants. Darfur is divided into three regions: the North, South and West. The capitals of these regions are El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina respectively.

The Darfur conflict has generated the world's worst humanitarian crisis since 2003, UN sources report. The battle and disease casualties range between 180'000 and 390'000. In 2008, some 4.5 million Darfur inhabitants were in need of humanitarian assistance (Tdh, 2009), and about 200'000 displaced persons moved to Chad, while over 2.5 million were displaced internally (Kim 2007; Tdh, 2009).

The Darfur conflict is multi-dimensional and extremely complex. It sparked from a combination of factors, ranging from political grievances and economic hardship to under-development, which were compounded further by the instrumentalization of ethnic groups (Assal, 2007; Tanner, 2004). A cursory glance at the history of Darfur province shows that the region has always been destabilized or marginalized. This dates as far back as the Turko-Egyptian (1821-1881), Mahdist (1881-1898) and Anglo-Egyptian (1898-1956) administrations, and has continued with the governments that have been in power since Sudan gained independence in 1956. The Darfur crisis erupted from an armed rebellion in 2003 at a time when South Sudan was still quenching the flames of another internal armed conflict that had lasted over 20 years. The rebels who occupy the *Jebel Mara* massif originate mainly from the *Fur* and *Zaghawa* tribes. The *Zaghawa* tribe covers a geographic area that stretches into Chad, and specifically includes President Idriss Deby's area of origin. Not long after the Darfur conflict broke out, it spiralled into an international conflict because of the geopolitical and demographic (ethnic composition) ties between Sudan, the neighboring countries and even beyond. Babett & Janszky (2007) tell of a tale of shifting alliances between Sudan and these countries. With the outbreak of the Darfur conflict, the government of Sudan, which was still trapped in the conflict in South Sudan, urged the population to

counter the rebels in Darfur by virtue of the *Popular Defense Act*, a law passed in 1989 to authorize the use of armed militias (Tanner, 2004). In response to this call, some Arab tribes embarked on what would later be termed genocide. The situation in Darfur is still very confused even though a branch of the rebel movement signed an agreement with the government in 2006. According to Human Rights Watch (2009), the initial situation of *destructive armed conflict between rebel forces and the government has transitioned into uncontrolled violent struggle for power and resources between government forces, pro-government janjaweed militias, rebel forces, ex-rebels, and bandits*. In March 2009, the International Criminal Court issued an international arrest warrant against the President of Sudan, Omar El Bechir. Since then, humanitarian organizations have seen the situation on the ground grow tenser. Thirteen international NGOs and three national NGOs have since been expelled from Darfur as a retaliatory measure. Some of these NGOs were working around Geneina, and more specifically in the camps managed by Tdh.

With regards to the situation in the camps, there is a lack of resources and services despite the heavy dependence of the refugees on NGOs and UN agencies. The traditional system for teaching/learning and the transfer of knowledge and know-how is falling apart. Violence is rampant and this further compounds the troubles of trauma victims who include a big number of refugees. The production and consumption of the home brew of alcohol has skyrocketed to alarming proportions. Security inside the camps is more and more problematic with the infiltration of militiamen and Chadian rebels who come looking for food and water supplies. Outside the camps, there is a permanent state of danger created by the janjawees and bandits: men are killed and women battered and abused quite often. Unlike the village setting, the camp environment is a new sociological reality with new players: the host communities, the local authorities represented through the HAC (Humanitarian Aid Commission), and several international NGOs and United Nations agencies. The interactions with these players facilitate the emergence of new forms of social and political order that are reflected in the management of and participation in community life.

All this raises quite a number of issues for research on the coordination of the refugee camps around Geneina, but let us begin with the overall problem of the study.

## 2. The problematic

Sudan is Africa's largest country equal in size to Western Europe. Sudan is bordered to the North by the Maghreb and to the South by the equatorial zone. Because of this geographic location, the country boasts an ethnically diverse and cosmopolitan socio-demographic fabric which is far more complex than the simple division between the Arab and Muslim population of the North and the African population in the South. This is evidenced by the several Arab nomad groups that migrate between these two regions, as well as the other groups that have settled either in the South or westwards in Darfur. For centuries, Sudan was one of the main routes of pilgrimage to Mecca<sup>1</sup>. And Darfur was the gateway for pilgrims from the whole of West Africa<sup>2</sup>. Darfur also became the home of several newcomers and migrants from different ethnic groups during and after the colonial conquest. The colonial wars from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century caused population movements from West Africa (Delmet, 1994). Migrants and immigrants in particular, moved for economic reasons to reach the vast fertile lands of the Darfur region<sup>3</sup>. The frontiers from the colonial era simply ignored the territorial boundaries of ethnic groups. But this did not stop these ethnic groups from moving across the frontiers established by the colonial authorities whenever the need arose, either because of the time of year or season, drought periods and low-yield or *hunger* seasons (De Waal, 2005; Babbitt & Janszky, 2007).

Today Sudan boasts about 570 tribes grouped in 56 ethnic groups (Gore, 1993)<sup>4</sup>. There are about 90 tribes in the Darfur region alone (Assal, 2007). The role and place of the tribe is not only vital in social hierarchy and differentiation, it actually governs the current system with *Sheikhs* who are all-powerful even in the refugee camps. Social organization across Sudan as a whole, and in Darfur in particular, builds to a large extent on the tribe. However, the conceptual and institutional dimension attached to the tribe today can be traced back to a specific period in history. The anthropological concepts of ethnic group, tribe, clan, or even lineage (see the definitions in the footnotes on page n°4) were framed within the context of colonization<sup>5</sup>. As concerns the ethnic group, Claude Rivière notes that: *the ethnonym may have been a group that was coined to address the needs of the colonial administration* (Boudon & all, 1989, p.84). Assal (2007) is of the view that the colonial administrators needed to classify their subjects,

*and this is what gave rise to the "tribal system"*. In pre-colonial social organization, there were structures of various sizes around the centers of power that were ruled by the *Sheikhs*. These latter wielded power over considerable amounts of resources: pasture, water, cattle routes (Assal, 2007). The reason for forming groups in society was to exploit land that belonged to a common ancestor. To institute *Indirect Rule*<sup>6</sup>, the British administrators encouraged the emergence of the tribe. Assal affirms that: *the tribe and its hierarchy of authority were necessary for the colonial regime in the same way as the colonial regime was necessary for the tribe* (idem, p.48). Put differently, the tribe, from this point onwards, was more than just a simple concept. The Darfur region had heretofore been a Sultanate run by the Fur, but the British colonial masters were going to split it among the major tribes. The tribal territories or *dars* were given to the major tribes while the smaller tribes were made to live under the authority of the tribal chiefs or *Sheikhs* of the dominant tribes (Young & all, 2005)<sup>7</sup>. The rule was simply that: *The 'claim' for an independent tribal administration is linked to ownership of a separate Dar as according to customary law a tribe could not have its own independent administration without having its own Dar* (id, p.55). The traditional authority and judicial functions of the *Sheikhs* were reinforced by a number of provisions (ex. the Powers of Nomad *Sheikhs* Ordinance of 1922 and its extension to the sedentary population in 1927). But, instead of being geared towards stabilizing and pacifying the region, this policy sought to hold in check and counter the seizure of power by *non-tribalized* elements such as the religious leaders (ex. the Mahdists who had just lost power to the colonial masters) and the educated elite living in the cities. Sudan's post-independence governments have since maintained this entire tribal system more or less. The issue of concern for them has been less about altering the reference to tribe in order to facilitate the emergence of a Sudanese nation, and more about redistributing power and resources among the tribes (Assal, 2007; Gore, 1993; Tanner, 2004). However, the *Sudanese Socialist Union*, led by Sudan's President Nimeiri (1969-1985), developed a theory based on political participation by professional bodies in the hope that it would take precedence over the identity-based tribal system. This effort ended in failure. For, even though it made sense to have these new categories in the urban areas, they were irrelevant to the farmers in rural areas and the nomads (Assal, 2007). The subsequent regimes were rather totalitarian. They instrumentalized tribal identity instead of building the foundation for a *post-tribal* Sudanese nation. The *Sheikh* system is still alive. It is replicated

in the camps that welcome those who have fled from the atrocities in Darfur.

The social reality in refugee camps is diverse and complex. It is the result of successive social deconstruction and reconstruction that has been dictated by new conditions of living. This social reality has ushered in a cohort of changes in the socio-demographic base (the family, ethnic composition, neighbors), dependency caused by the loss of economic and financial self-reliance, and new ways of intervention and interaction with new players such as NGOs.

A new form of social organization, which is more conducive to these conditions of living, is being put in place. This is evidenced by the efforts made by Tdh and partner organizations to establish a new system for managing community life. This new system, which exists already in some camps, is an approach based on community participation that is aligned with the edicts of the HCR. With this approach, the community is perceived as a pluralistic entity and all its component parts (men, women, young people, elderly persons, children, sub-groups) enjoy the protection of their rights, dignity, and their participation in making decisions that affect their lives (UNHCR, 2007). The shift from the Sheikh system to one of community participation is a major social change, and its delivery has provoked some resistance or certain difficulties.

### 3. Objectives of the study

The objectives of this study are:

- To analyze how social groups interact with one another and relate to each other (when it comes to handling power, negotiating, and dealing with conflict);
- To elucidate the political, cultural and situational issues at stake, so as to know what conditions are appropriate for community participation;
- To update and review the current forms of social organization and group dynamics in the camps concerned;
- To compare and analyze the situation today and the one that prevailed before the conflicts and population movements;
- To compare the various camps and know what factors enable community participation and what efforts need to be made in each camp;
- To ensure that the study includes a camp management assessment done by the refugees themselves.

The study not only analyses the overall situation in the camps; it also identifies the roles of the influential players or those who should have an influential role in the management and coordination of the camps, including the vulnerable persons. For those working on the ground, the study attempts to provide a framework for analyzing and understanding information. It includes an analysis of future trends that should facilitate community participation, organization and a strategy for effective and efficient management of the camps. For community participation to be a success, self-reliant management of the camps by refugees has been set as the mid-term goal.

## 4. Methodology

### Methodological considerations

For the study to achieve the objectives mentioned above, it needed to have a methodological approach that facilitates systematic understanding and assessment of:

- The overall situation in the camps, and interactions with the environment;
- The issues inherent in the social life and power relations inside the camps;
- The socially influential and/or structurally privileged players and individuals;
- The concrete relations between the social groups and individuals considered;
- A comparative analysis of the actors' perceptions of the overall situation and other actors;
- The level of conflict and tolerance of rival factions, social groups and competing actors;
- The different views on community management and participation.

For this to happen, our approach consisted in adopting a set of complementary tools, techniques and

methods. Even though we were under no obligation to combine qualitative and quantitative methods, we deemed it vital to do so and ensure our analyses would be reliable and valid. Each method had its loopholes, but the diverse nature of the methods tended to minimize the margin of error and misinterpretation even through the issues and problem under research were complex. The qualitative methods allowed for in-depth research for information on specific topics. On the other hand, the quantitative methods proved a more appropriate resource for reaching the highest possible number of persons, as was the case during assessment of refugee involvement in community activities.

The qualitative approach involved the use of several survey techniques, while the quantitative survey included the administration of a questionnaire.

### The methodological approaches

- **Qualitative surveys.** *Observation:* observing key moments of exchange in social life in the camps was a vital means of gathering information. Such observation enabled us to witness, understand and adequately interpret social interactions. We had the occasion to conduct systematic visits to the three camps concerned, accompany staff to work each day, talk to the refugees and ask them to share with us the meaning of their actions. We visited some households, health centers, food distribution points (WFP, CONCERN), centers for elderly persons (HELPAGE), and adolescents and children in the early years (Tdh). We also attended Camp Coordination Meetings in the three camps, awareness meetings for women, and Camp Coordination Working Groups.

*Exploratory interviews:* on the margin of the direct contacts we had with the resource persons, we held unstructured interviews which were framed around open-ended questions. It is in the same vein that upon our arrival in Khartoum, and later in Geneina, we held a total of four unstructured interviews with Tdh staff members who work directly with the refugees or are responsible for camp coordination. These interviews were highly useful, for they enabled us to have a broad idea of how the camps are organized as well as what happens in them, to understand how Tdh conducts its activities on the ground, and to assess feedback given to Tdh staff members by beneficiaries. The exploratory interviews facilitated the elaboration of grids for subsequent interviews, and finally for designing the questionnaire. They enabled us also to realize just how sensitive surveys on certain subjects could be.

*Semi-directive interviews:* after the exploratory phases, we conducted semi-directive interviews that enabled us to progress further in the gathering of precise and specific information, and to analyze the meaning and rationale for the practices, behaviors and viewpoints of the various respondents. Through observation and exploratory interviews, we were able to identify the major players with whom we conducted the semi-directive interviews. These players did include Tdh staff members, women's representatives, Sheikhs, and members of other NGOs.

We designed the questionnaire (see Annex 1) based on the objectives we had set for the study and the points on which the study was expected to provide concrete answers. We took the precaution, however, to make slight changes to the questionnaire so as to ensure it was suitable for each respondent.

*Focus groups:* focus groups were a means for us to bring together respondents to discuss the subjects we had chosen for that purpose. We thus invited them to express and share their views on issues related to social life, problems encountered, their group dynamics, and their involvement in community life (see the *focus group guide*, Annex 3). We held four focus group sessions with the young people and women in the Dorti and Ardamata camps. Our respondents were mostly persons identified as active participants in community activities. These two camps were priority targets, because instituting and entrenching community participation in them seemed more difficult to achieve. Between six and eight persons took part in each of the sessions.

Focus groups have the added value of providing space to gather elements for analysis in an interactive and spontaneous manner. Nevertheless, the presence of dignitaries may prevent the other respondents from expressing themselves freely. We observed that even though we had encouraged each respondent to participate freely in the discussions, most of them seemed to rely on their designated spokesperson to talk on their behalf.

- **Questionnaire survey.** While the focus group targeted the more active groups, we deemed it useful to reach out to a high number of refugees to have data we could generalize to the entire population. Indeed, there was a need to go beyond the attitudes and claims expressed by specific groups, or even the leaders of these groups, and tease out the real trends in the camps. To do so, we sent out a questionnaire

designed only for the IDPs in the three camps. In doing so, we got assistance from Tdh employees working already in the camps.

- **Questionnaire design and problems encountered.**

At the time we were designing the questionnaire, it was reported that the IDPs did not like to be surveyed. In fact, the Sheikhs and household heads alike did not want these *censuses* to be taken, owing to claims that figures were being inflated deliberately as a ploy to obtain more food. On this point, the Sheikhs won the support of the authorities, especially the HAC. Security measures and the need to protect data were advanced also as reasons for the refusal. Usually the HAC must authorize such information gathering initiatives, but it is generally not keen on releasing information on IDPs for strategic reasons and as a measure to reduce NGO latitude for action. Because of the good relations between Tdh and HAC management, we easily obtained the said authorization even though it cost us a section of the questionnaire on security in the camps.

We also included in the questionnaire some questions on IDP satisfaction with the work of Tdh to give it the seal of a *satisfaction survey*. Fortunately though, the questionnaire contained other columns of interest to our study: Sheikh-to-IDP feedback on important decisions, the desire of IDPs to be consulted, and ways to improve community participation, among other things (See Annex?).

The questionnaire was translated to Arabic by two translators hired by Tdh. It was tested by two other members of the local staff, one (head of the Social Worker's team) of whom served as an interpreter during the information session on the questionnaire before the survey itself actually began.

- **Sampling and respondent profile.** *Sampling method:* as mentioned earlier, we needed to reach a relevant number of refugees in order to have the information we required. But, unless the level of organization on the ground so permits, being able to systematically locate individuals selected at random from a list may be an uphill task. In the case of simple random selection, the absence of a person who has been selected may be a cause for concern. Similarly, the absence of registers makes cluster sampling even more difficult.

In our case, we opted for the *Random Route Sampling*<sup>8</sup> method. It is a way of selecting respondents or households in advance. For this study, we chose to survey

three camps and all the sections. For each section, the principle was to begin from a precise point and survey all the five shelters from a specific geographic point. This method is suitable in cases where the entire population is hard to identify and update on a regular basis, where land surveys are not done in a systematic manner, and where locating people in the camps is difficult.

We conducted the surveys during the rainy season when many refugees had returned to the village to work on farms. We know also that there are fewer refugees in the camps than stated. The Sheikhs overestimate the number of persons under their responsibility to obtain more food. Looking back, our decision to adopt *Random Route sampling* proved judicious.

- **Profile of the respondents:** the exercise of establishing the profile of the respondents allows having indications on who speaks in the household, who is present during the hours of the survey (between 10 am in the morning and 2 pm in the afternoon). It is of particular importance to check whether the answers are likely to be influenced by the characteristics of a typical profile, especially if the trends (tendencies) in the answers are influenced by a group of respondents most representative.

The number of interviewees in Ardamata, Dorti and Riyad camps was respectively 50, 44 and 65, for a total of 159 IDPs (see Table 8, Annex 4). Their distribution by sex shows the following: 67 men interviewed (representing 42% of the respondents) and 92 women (58%) (see Table 9, Annex 4). The interviewees were in three age categories, the *young people* between 18 and 35 years old, the *middle age* which has between 36 and 60 years, the *elders* from 61 to 99 years old (see Table 10, Annex 4). The young people represents the biggest group with 60 %, then come the "middle age group" (33%) and the elders with less than 7%. The interviewees are married, in almost 78 % of the cases. They belong to various tribes; the most important tribes being Massalit, Arenga and Tama (see section 5.3). They live within their tribal communities (approximately 40% of them), or with their neighbors from their village of origin (40%); 20 % of them live in a community formed under the circumstances of displacement, that is to say communities formed of tribal mixity and of villages of origin. In more than 96% of the cases, the interviewed IDPs live under the responsibility of a Sheikh. Less than 2% assert being under the responsibility of a Sheikha or a mixed committee.

## Footnotes section 1

- <sup>1</sup> The pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia is one of the five pillars of Islam. The Red Sea, along which Sudan's coastal region spreads for 853 km, separates the region of Mecca from the coastal region of Sudan.
- <sup>2</sup> The pilgrims and their families worked as farm labourers in Darfur to pay for their voyage, but many of them settled there before and after their trip to Mecca. A case in point provided by Delmet (1994) is that of the Pulaars or Fulani from Senegambia.
- <sup>3</sup> Droughts began to occur more and more frequently after 1969 (Gore, 1993).
- <sup>4</sup> The difference between the clan, tribe and ethnic group is as follows: the ethnic group is formed by several tribes and the tribe by several clans (Boudon & all, 1989). **The clan** is defined as a group of individuals with unilinear paternal or maternal lineage from a common legendary or mythical ancestor. **The tribe** is a large segmental group made up of several clans. It is a group with several basic segments (extended family) that come together once they feel threatened. At a higher level, **the ethnic group** is an entity designated by a name (ethnonym) and that has a common origin, cultural tradition, language, territory, history and especially a sense of belonging to this group (Boudon & all, id.).
- <sup>5</sup> It is worth noting that anthropology was initially at the service of the colonial administration and studied non-European societies, while sociology focused on European societies.
- <sup>6</sup> The British administrative system went through local chiefs to rule over the colonies.
- <sup>7</sup> This sharing of the territory in tribal Dars for sedentary groups would later constitute a source of conflict, because some nomadic populations (especially the Arabs) will have no pastures owing to growing stress and pressure on the environment.
- <sup>8</sup> For more details, see Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik (2003)



A young girl is shown from the side, filling a clear plastic bottle from a large, cylindrical metal water tank. The tank is mounted on a wooden frame. The background shows a thatched roof structure. The entire image is overlaid with a semi-transparent blue filter.

# 2

## Results and analysis

## 1. Conceptual perspectives

The problem stated above relates the origin of the Sheikh system and questions the pertinence and implications of this system for refugee camps specifically. Before delving into the empirical reality, it may be useful, just to permit better understanding of the issues at stake, to do a comparative analysis between the Sheikh system and the community participation system. So, it is interesting to look for the theoretical elements which help to identify the groups considered vulnerable or non-represented in the management of the community.

### Characteristics of the traditional Sheikh system

A certain number of characteristics of the Sheikh system are worth noting.

- The Sheikhs have a political function which is different from the religious role of the spiritual leader or Imam. These two functions are cumulative, not contradictory.
- By virtue of their position, the Sheikhs control the resources in their areas of origin or of the extended family.
- The Sheikh system draws its legitimacy from tradition and history which date back often to the first occupancy of land by an ancestor.
- Their power comes directly from the tribal system. Jean Beachler, in his definition of the tribe, says: « *each level of segmentation has the political organs required to protect common interests at that level. In the family, the oldest family member and a council of guardians ensure harmony, the management of the heritage, and the resolution of conflicts. At the level higher than this one, a council of oldest family members and family representatives settle conflicts by arbitration, ensure compliance with common rules, and mobilize forces against external aggression. Above this level, the organs are no longer permanent and get formed only when need be* » (In Boubon & all, 1989, p.200). At the local level, the Sheikhs are the custodians of social power.
- Indeed, traditional identity structures, such as the tribe, emerge and perpetuate themselves in order to have control over and access to natural resources. The objective is to protect what is owned in whole or in part. According to Gore (1993), several collective

*functions actually are testimony of the integrity of a given territory, which the group attaches itself to and protects from any form of intrusion. One can deduce that the integrity of territorial and economic bases is a prerequisite for effectiveness in collective and political functions. Conversely, refugee camps represent a reality different from that in the village, which reality constitutes a loss of the socio-economic support base of the Sheikh system.*

- The system for designating Sheikhs follows the social hierarchy pattern in extended families. The way the Sheikhs are appointed follows a system based on social hierarchy in extended families. The Sheikhs belong to the traditional high society of Darfur which implies a system based on caste. For each village, the Sheikh often comes from the most representative tribe and more exactly from the highest social strata of this tribe. They often possessed lands and cattle, factors and symbols of wealth in the local context.

### Comparisons with community participation

If one compares the community approach and the Sheikh system, some fundamental differences between them come to the fore.

- 1) *The political and collective functions* in the community approach are open to all individuals, irrespective of their age, sex, ethnic origin, etc. These functions are performed within a system representing the various entities of the community.
- 2) Instead of being confined to a small group, *control over resources* is done by the majority and in the interest of the community. The emphasis placed on efficiency suggests that such control actually is a (re-) distribution of resources based on the needs and requirements of the community, and not on the basis of a social connection or family relationship.
- 3) *The legitimacy* of the community approach depends on circumstance, because it is dictated by the desire to share and the role of actors in a refugee camp. This legitimacy does not preclude traditional legitimacy, for it accepts and justifies the involvement of identity-based social groups (tribes), as well as other types of groups (women, young people, the disabled, etc.).
- 4) *The source of social power* in this new approach is won by redefining power relations. This redefinition involves a two-pronged process: the destruction of the socio-economic foundation of the Sheikh system

and, by implication, the power of the Sheikhs; and the institution of values such as equality and human rights that are championed by international organizations.

5) Mutual acceptance by the actors and various components of the community seems to be the *prerequisite* for effective community participation in this specific case. The change in community management is in terms of values (cultural, ideological or religious values) as well as the issues at stake (economic or political, meaning power).

Any form of social change meets with *resistance* from those who enjoyed the favors of the previous system: with the advent of community participation, the Sheikhs are going to lose their exclusive command over the execution of power. On the other hand, their position in the new system is less favorable, because their socio-economic base is going to be dismantled. It is understandable, therefore, that efforts to institute a new approach encounter difficulties and become a source of conflict in a more or less explicit manner. This attests that the potential for compatibility between the two systems is low. It is needless to state that this *compatibility is polarized*: while the new system tolerates and integrates the Sheikh system (positive relation), the reverse is yet to be proven.

How then do we explain that the two systems currently exist side by side? The *current balance* seems to be a status quo between the two major advocates of the two systems. The Sheikhs certainly have power, but such power is barely or not at all exercised on the other players such as the government authorities through the HAC, NGOs, and UN agencies. These latter (including Tdh) are service providers and suppliers of staple products that the Sheikhs and their communities need. *Trying to compromise and avoid conflict* is the prevalent trend and it institutes a certain form of balance.

This conceptual design is important if one has to understand the overall situation, but it overlooks several factors that come into play, as the data from the field indicate.


### The hierarchy-based traditional social system and identification of the vulnerable groups

A better understanding of the established domination relationships is given by the social hierarchical system according to the tradition in Darfur. The appeal to the

hierarchy-based traditional social system is essential for the identification of the socially vulnerable persons. It is a question of analyzing the distribution criteria of the social power to first identify the favored groups and those discriminated by the system of representation and participation in the management of the community.


Traditional logic for conferring authority and defining power relations in society is based on two principles: gender and age. Indeed, men have power over women just as older persons do over the younger ones. The gender criterion is based on the principle of family division of labor (house work versus work outside the household), and more precisely on gender-based division of labor. While gender-based division of labor finds some justification in physiological considerations, it is actually the result of a social construct that designates who controls the means of production in the extended traditional family. Power distribution from the age paradigm reflects the principle of seniority which is one of the legacies of the survival strategies of agricultural/pastoral societies, based on the experience of the most elderly persons and compliance with their decisions (Locoh, 1995)<sup>9</sup>.

Figure 1: Distribution of social power by gender and age criteria



The two fundamental principles of gender and age command the distribution of social power in interpersonal relationships. The third principle is the system of social stratification with the existence of castes considered lower with regard to the others within the same ethnic group or tribe. Figure 2 integrates this third guiding axis on a tridimensional plan.

Figure 2: The three guiding axis of traditional social hierarchy



In the traditional village context, the political and democratic stability, justifies the exercise of power by the tribe or majority ethnic group. The transposition of this system in refugee camps can pose to less extent the problem of the representation of minority

tribes within the various communities. The data of the questionnaire on the ethnic and tribal membership give a precise idea of the sizes of the various identical groups (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Distribution of respondents by tribe




Figure 3 shows considerable disparities of size between the present tribes in the camps concerned by the survey. The main tribes are *Massalit* (34 %), *Arenga* (23 %) and *Tama* (16 %). The sample distribution suggests a weak presence of the other tribes. Tribes such as *Mararit* and *Abu Dreik* represent only 0.6 % of the random sample. The reasons of this disparity can be explained by the gregarious instinct: the fact that the refugees settle down rather within their village and tribal communities. So, some minority tribes in certain camps are majority in the others. Table 6 shows the disparity of the distribution of tribes in 3 camps according to the sample. In any case, the minority tribal communities are under-represented with regard to those members of majority groups, in decision making fora in the camps.

In summary, we identify vulnerable or under-represented groups on the basis of the principles of gender (the women group), of seniority (the youth group), of social stratification (the casted groups), of the tribal majority (the small-sized tribal communities). Some individuals or groups of persons can belong at the same time to the categories listed. This theoretical framework is important in the understanding of the general situation but it ignores several factors which come into play such as show it the empirical data.

### Empirical perspectives

- **Social interrelationships in the camps:** IDPs usually have the same conditions of living. They find themselves in an environment that is less hospitable and have no access to their resources and belongings. The international agencies that provide basic foodstuffs and services place them on an equal footing. This uniformity in living conditions and equality in right of access to resources are major factors of pacification in the relations IDPs have with one another.

Social relations are generally very good in refugee camps, even though conflicts are inherent in all forms of social life. People socialize and occasions such as christening, marriage and funeral ceremonies are opportunities for tightening relations between refugees. They share the same religion, the same or almost the same cultural values. In the camps covered by our study, displacement and/or installation in the camps is done by the village or tribal communities, which can be the same in some cases. The tribes live side by side with one another as in the village and the Sheikh's function is conferred on the dominant tribe. Table I below provides respondents' answers to the question about IDP living communities.

Table I: Living community

	Effectives	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulated Percentage
No response	4	2.5	2.5	2.5
Tribe	59	36.4	36.4	38.9
Tribe and Village of origin	2	1.2	1.2	40.1
All the village of origin	28	17.3	17.3	57.4
Previous neighborhood	39	24.1	24.1	81.5
Previous neighborhood and different tribes	1	0.6	0.6	82.1
Different tribes	29	17.9	17.9	100.0
Total	162	100.0	100.0	

It shows that 36% of IDPs in our sample group live with their tribe, 24% live currently with the same neighbors they have in the village, and 17% with their village community. Only about 18% live with different tribes. From a sociological perspective, this means that over 80% of IDPs in the camps concerned live in their social setting of choice. This attests to the social ties and social capital that the IDPs enjoy as displaced persons. In fact, the absence of social ties represents a weakening in the social support chain and raises the propensity for the IDPs to be vulnerable.


The family is the basic unit in social life, and in this case we are referring to the extended family. Families do not only cooperate together, but also have exchanges between them at several levels in the economic and social realms. It is in this respect that marriage comes as an alliance between two families and between different social groups. Apart from the preferential marriages between cross cousins (that is, between the male and female children of first cousins), there are inter-tribal marriages as well, except in the *Zaghawa* tribe where assortative marriages (homogamy: marriages celebrated only between people from the same social group) are the norm. This shows that identity does matter and is perpetuated without provoking inter-tribal conflict. The herd instinct or reliance on identity is not the cause of conflict, because control over resources is not organized around access to and protection of capital that belongs to, or is wanted by the group.

- **Economic activities:** Economic activities are limited to the refugee camps. This is because of the region's state of under-development and the armed conflicts

that have caused population movement and dislocated the local economy. The presence of armed bandits and the *Janjaweds* is a source of permanent danger for those who venture out of the camps. Several cases of gender violence and sexual abuse on women have been deplored. Men are most at risk of being killed. Women are less exposed than men and manage to perform certain activities, such as fetching firewood and farming outside and around the camps. They are able to also find work in the brick factories that prefer to employ women, for they get paid less than men.

The economic situation inside the camps is generally on the low side and varies from one camp to the other. The fact that the camps are located near to, and interact with Geneina town impacts considerably on their economic situation. Their close proximity to Geneina significantly attenuates security concerns, and makes it possible for women and men to easily find jobs there. The Riyadh camp is located adjacent to Geneina. The youth learn different trades, such as bricklaying, carpentry, mechanics, etc. The women engage in trade, work as house servants, etc. On the other hand, some hawkers and petty traders come from town to sell their wares in the market. The Ardamata camp is farther away from Geneina and suffers a higher unemployment rate. The Dorti camp has a better situation than the Ardamata camp, but it is less privileged than the Riyadh camp. A good indicator for evaluating the economic dynamism of these three camps is the market: in terms of its size, the diverse nature of trades and services proposed, the type of innovative activities offered (projection of video films for cash).

Figure 4: Current occupation of the respondents



This histogram shows the main occupation of the respondents. The data shows that barely 10% are involved in professional activities, while 45% undertake self-reliant economic activities (farming, petty trade, etc.). About 40% of the IDPs serve as house servants.

### The current role and status of Sheikhs

The outbreak of the Darfur conflict compelled entire communities to live in refugee camps. To care for these IDPs, the institutions in charge called on them to get organized so they would be identified and their numbers assessed to prepare for the delivery of much-needed support. For the purpose of efficiency, humanitarian organizations, primarily HCR and WFP<sup>10</sup>, channelled their efforts from the onset through the existing traditional structure. But by doing so, they were indirectly perpetuating the Sheikh system in a new form beyond the village setting and defining the distribution of power in the camps. For the camps covered by this study, two inter-related facts reinforce the continuity of the Sheikh system: *the spatial organization and structural organization of the camps*.

The IDPs are installed by sector as they arrive progressively in the camps. These sectors are divided into blocks that are occupied by the different village or tribal communities<sup>11</sup>. In the majority of cases, population displacements and resettlement are organized in groups (village and/or tribal communities) at the instigation of the Sheikhs. This is why small groups of communities<sup>11</sup> are scattered in the different sectors within the camps. At the same time, the national and international organizations recognize the structural organization of the camps, which is related closely to the spatial organization. Prior to the displacements, each village had only one Sheikh from the dominant tribe<sup>12</sup>. But the break-up of communities leaving the villages actually played in favor of an increase in the number of Sheikhs, because those community groups that had broken up needed to elect a Sheikh upon arrival in the camps. As a matter of necessity, therefore, the Sheikh system has taken a new form in this new context.

To receive food and shelter, the refugees are indeed encouraged (obliged, in fact) to join the small community groups placed under the responsibility of Sheikhs. This causes the Sheikhs to play a central role in processes such as:

- The registration and counting of displaced persons;

- The attribution of *refugee status*<sup>13</sup> (to members of their communities);
- The distribution of goods and services to IDPs;
- Problem identification;
- The expression and evaluation of the needs of IDPs;
- The search for solutions to problems.

The Sheikhs perform their duties and receive incentives in return based on the number of refugees under their responsibility.

According to our survey, 98% of respondents belong to communities led by Sheikhs. The Sheikhs are *community representatives* to the authorities, NGOs and United Nations agencies. At the same time, the government authorities and the HAC, which react in a range of different ways (cooperation and hostility) towards international organizations, try to control and manipulate these Sheikhs. The Sheikhs who are in good terms with the government authorities and the HAC obtain services and favors in return. They also have the possibility of objecting to certain activities initiated by certain NGOs, as was the case in camps such as Krinding<sup>14</sup>. This central role assumed by the Sheikhs led a Camp Manager (Tdh staff) to say: *The sheikhs are the door of the camp; you cannot enter somewhere without passing by the door*. The Sheikhs occupy an important position in the social microcosm in the camps where they enjoy a higher status. This social position is the outcome of the roles and functions they assume.

As the intermediaries between external organizations and their communities, the Sheikhs have developed the capacities that enable them to adapt to their new roles, and to also deal with new stakeholders (international agencies) who have policies and practices of their own. The Sheikhs elected after displacements are chosen on the basis of their level of education, the breadth of their experience, and their capacities to understand how NGOs work. With the context in refugee camps, there is a much more subtle approach to the criteria for choosing Sheikhs<sup>15</sup>. Young people and women are increasingly being elected to serve as Sheikhs. The strategy is to maximize the resources obtained from foreign agencies. But this also has a negative effect: some Sheikhs pursue their own selfish interests to the detriment of their communities<sup>16</sup>.

Some communities have organized themselves to dismiss their Sheikhs<sup>17</sup>. There is a significant contrast between the two images of the Sheikh before and after displacements. In the village setting, the Sheikh is supposed to be a prestigious man who owns land and cattle, and who provides help to needy villagers. In the camps, Sheikhs do not have the economic power to provide assistance to the persons under their responsibility<sup>18</sup>. But on the other hand, they have other types of roles. To have a clearer idea of the areas in which IDPs rely on their Sheikhs, we proposed several possible choices, as the table below shows. Table 2 presents in one line the needs that IDPs often have, and under the columns the major players (including ourselves) who can provide the support required to address those needs. For each need, there was a possibility of designating several players. Hence, the figures in the cells show the number of times that a player is earmarked to address a need.

The results show that IDPs rely on the Sheikhs mainly to resolve *conflicts* (102 in 183 responses). With a lower level of emphasis than they placed on *conflicts*, the IDPs affirmed that they counted on the Sheikhs

for *administrative procedures* (76 in 155 responses). On other matters, the Sheikhs provided only marginal support for the needs IDP expressed. The table also illustrates the key role played by NGOs and UN agencies regarding the needs considered.

Some of the roles played by the Sheikhs do not feature in the questionnaire data. The Sheikhs are responsible for order in the camps. They have two key functions in this regard. In distributing food WFP deals directly with the Sheikhs who receive the food rations for members of their communities. This helps prevent mob action and insecurity during food distribution. The Sheikhs also settle conflicts and, as we saw earlier, this is the most important role that IDPs expect them to perform (see data on previous table). But what is this role all about?

The Sheikhs do not have the means to fight against the rampant insecurity in the camps<sup>19</sup> and which is caused by armed individuals outside the camps. This is the prerogative of the government Police forces that are present in the camps, albeit in low numbers. However, the Police hand over this responsibility to

Table 3: the social and institutional support network

	My-self	My family	My Sheikh	My neighborhood	Community Committees	NGO Agencies	Total
Food	38	11	1	0	1	117	168
Water	6	1	0	0	0	142	149
Health	8	0	1	1	1	139	150
Non food item	52	12	1	0	0	85	150
Income generating activity	85	13	1	3	1	37	140
Solving conflicts	15	29	102	10	21	6	183
Financial support	102	24	0	0	3	16	145
Moral support	34	40	11	8	5	66	164
Administrative procedures	33	14	76	0	24	8	155
Other services	45	15	16	2	20	41	139

the Sheikhs when there is conflict between IDPs and ask them almost always to settle the matter amicably. If conflict erupts between IDPs who are all under the responsibility of the same Sheikh, he works alone or together with the heads of the families concerned to settle the matter. This leads him to intervene in the problems couples have and also to serve as a counselor. If the conflict is between two IDPs under the responsibility of different Sheikhs, these latter decide to settle it as the representatives of the IDPs involved. If they cannot reach a consensus, they refer the matter to the Sheikh of the sector where they are, or take it above to the leader of Sheikhs. For conflicts of considerable magnitude, the matter is taken before the council of elders. The council of elders or *wakuba* gathers all the Sheikhs under the *talking tree* to discuss and settle matters of high importance. If, exceptionally, the Council of Sheikhs fails to reach a consensus, the leader of the Sheikhs has to issue a final decision.

The decisions taken together by the Sheikhs are backed by all, for the government authorities in general, and the Police in particular, go by the decisions of the Sheikhs. Where a refugee repeatedly breaches law and order, the Sheikhs may decide that the Police should expel him from the camp. But such a decision comes only as a last resort after several failed attempts at mediation. There is a code of conduct in the camps and the Sheikhs make sure that the rules, law and order are kept.

This interlude has enabled us to look at the hierarchy in the Sheikh system as it is organized in a camp such as Riyadh camp. At the helm is the Council of elders, followed a level below by the leader of the Sheikhs, then the sector Sheikhs who control the Sheikhs of village/tribal communities.

### Group dynamics

Our goal in this section is to see if other social groups emerge or have the potential to do so. Community participation cannot be meaningful, unless there is a demonstrated will for involvement that is accepted mutually by the multitude of social actors who belong to the different segments of the population. Mutual acceptance by all players is the prerequisite we have set for the community approach. The passage from the traditional system to the community approach has met with cultural resistance because it opens up to other social categories some collective functions that had so far been reserved exclusively for Sheikhs. These latter are the key artisans of the resistance to

community involvement. On the other hand, the new players do not feel they automatically have the right to participate actively in community life. And it is in the same vein that they may choose not to exercise this right in an effort to stick to their own values which are determined also by culture. As regards community participation, elements such as *attachment* to culture, social representations and the value system may to some extent explain the resistance seen in the Sheikhs and, at the same time, justify why the other actors refuse to exercise their rights. In view of the foregoing, community participation cannot become reality unless the social actors and groups concerned are willing and ready to seize this opportunity they have and redefine the roles of all actors concerned. It is obvious therefore that the social actors and groups that display some dynamism in efforts towards community participation are the ones who are potentially in favor of it. Each camp has its particularities when it comes to resistance and the dynamism of other social groups like women and young people. By using qualitative surveys as our base, we attempted to measure this group dynamism through indicators such as:

- The existence of a formal or informal structure like a *committee* (women/youth committee);
- The availability of a meeting place and convening point for the group concerned;
- The frequency and effectiveness of meetings;
- The topics and content of discussions during meetings;
- The recreational and leisure activities;
- Group initiatives and actions (community activities: e.g. public area cleaning and maintenance);
- System for representation and election of group leaders;
- Current level of participation in decision making bodies in the camp (camp coordination, Working Group, committees, task force).
- **Women as players in community participation:** the status of women has traditionally been that of a dependant, because of family and sexual division of labor and the social hierarchy in Darfur's patriarchal society. The roles of men and women define fundamentally the rules for power sharing in the couple.

The man is the family head and breadwinner, while the woman takes charge of house work even if she has some elbow room to do so.

In Dorti and Riyad, one sees true dynamism in women's groups that have organized themselves to serve as *neighborhood* committees in each sector, and then as *women's committees* in each camp. The women's committee is headed by a woman who is elected and bears the title of *Sheikha* (female Sheikh). She is flanked by representatives of the different sectors that make up the *Committee Board*. In the said camps, women have the right to be represented in decision making bodies, the right to voice, and the right to protect the interests of all women.

During the meetings we attended, they were represented by two women while men made up the vast majority of the participants. The Sheikhs do not object to the presence of women. Sheikh Adam, who is the leader of the Sheikhs in Riyad, affirmed, during the interview we had with him, that young people and women have the right to participate in decision making, for they are better placed to protect their own interests. In Dorti, the women's committees have acquired more prerogatives and skills with the consent of the Sheikhs: they take charge of and provide moral support to sexually abused women. The monthly contributions women make are used to, among other things, provide financial support to these victims of sexual abuse.

Topics for discussion during meetings: The women have become more open-minded and talk about everything, from violence against women to early marriages and all the other problems that relate to the status of women.

The situation we have described in the Dorti and Riyad camps is totally different from the one in Ardamata camp. The women in this camp are not organized, even though they affirmed, during the group discussion, that they wanted to set up a structure. However, some of them are very active and have gained some experience after the first contacts they had with the Ardamata Camp Coordination Team. The reaction of the Sheikhs here has been a categorical no to women's participation in Ardamata camp meetings. The Sheikhs have further addressed a direct word of caution to the husbands of the women concerned (they even went to the extent of questioning their manhood).

The women in the three camps complain about the departure of *Save the Children-US* and the impact this is having on the income generating activities that were already under way. The premises that this institution provided to the women served as their meeting and discussion point. In my view, the lack of a meeting room may have an impact on their freedom of movement, and especially on the group dynamics that still need to be reinforced.

- **The youth as actors in community participation:** young people are a particular category of people, because their youthfulness raises specific problems tied to the need for them to develop and fulfill their potential (to enter the world of work and set up a family). Life in the camps is similar to life in prison and future prospects are rather on the dull side (unemployment, lack of leisure activities).

The youth in Ardamata camp feel marginalized. Their accumulated frustrations cause them to demonstrate a certain form of rivalry with the Sheikhs. The youth have intervened several times by force to sabotage and halt *plastic sheet assessments*. Their actions were directed specifically at the Sheikhs whom they consider to be corrupt. The Tdh Camp Coordination Team wanted to organize regular meetings between the youth and the Sheikhs, but these latter refused the initiative. After the youth organized themselves and set up committees, the Sheikhs accepted finally that they should take part in the decision making bodies. The pressure exerted by the youth on the Sheikhs had caused them to cave in finally, which was not the case for women.

The youth in Ardamata camp organize football matches between the youth in the respective sectors. In Riyad camp, we noted also that football matches were being organized among the youth.

Dorti camp has a youth committee, but it was inactive during the field survey because of problems that occurred between the young IDPs and the youth of host communities; the former felt marginalized by the latter. At present, there is a two-pronged structure with two presidents. Efforts to reconcile the two are under way and new elections are scheduled to take place. The youths however have representatives in the camp's decision making bodies.

The youth and women in the Riyad camp have representatives who sit in the CC Meetings.

- **Other potential actors for community participation:** the actors involved in the social organization of refugee camps are identified by age and gender, the two guiding principles of social differentiation. It was therefore obvious for these two guiding principles to be the entry point for forming and promoting the first social groups, a move saluted as a major shift in the cultural setting concerned. But the establishment of such social groups (women's and youth committees) remains a work in progress, as attested by the difficulties to set up a women's group in Ardamata camp due to the Sheikhs' firm opposition to women's participation in the camp's decision making bodies. Acceptance of youth involvement in this regard came only after the use of force or pressure against the Sheikhs. Fortunately, the Dorti and Riyad camps present another picture, one of total acceptance of women and young people by the Sheikhs.

This change seems to be on an accelerating trend which *results apparently from the camp's proximity to Geneina*. As we explained earlier, this proximity to town has facilitated access to employment for youth and women, and is actually the main catalyst or accelerator of the change process. Against the backdrop of poverty and dependency in the camps, the newly acquired economic power of young people and women has improved their social status and group awareness. The Sheikhs show considerably less resistance and are more receptive to the values of the urban setting that focus less on the divisions between men and women, and between old people and young people.

Ethnicity is another factor of social differentiation that plays an important role in the processes of social identification. But it has not been the defining paradigm for grouping IDPs in the camps. Identity carries with it an intrinsic element of danger in the context of inter-ethnic conflicts in Darfur. The grouping of IDPs by caste is another product of ethnic differentiation, for castes are the strata or hierarchical levels in an ethnic group. They are tied to the differential value that traditional society places on trades and the means of production available to its members. The camps show no signs that castes will emerge as dynamic social groups. The refugees do not systematically ply their trades along the lines of the caste system. And this makes irrelevant any effort to form social groups by caste.

The modern context may facilitate the creation of groups according to the modern professions that come with the close proximity to town. But it is hard to envisage unionization without external support

(accelerator effect). To form groups around professional ties, there should be stability, durability and a critical mass that make professional consciousness and solidarity a reality.

The relationship between IDPs and host communities may be examined from another angle. We are yet to get proof that there is value added in constituting host communities. The host community offers privileges (services, goods, food) because of identification of IDPs.

Several factors existing at different dimensions affect the fragile balance of social life in refugee camps. It is the power relations among the multitude of social actors (individuals and groups) in the camps that bring about such balance. However, the perception that life in a refugee camp is a transition that lasts for a limited period of time, even if it is prolonged in actual fact, constitutes the first source of danger for such balance. This perception tends to reduce people's efforts and commitment to establish or adapt to political stability (distribution of power) and social stability (establishment of norms and rules). In other words, new social players and new social rules are hard to form and develop in refugee camps because the conditions of camp life are difficult and transitional. The groups currently in the refugee camps reflect the hierarchy in traditional societies framed around the guiding principles (gender, with women, and seniority, with youth). This means that the set-up inside refugee camps (the existing core of social groups) replicates and calls to mind the traditional structure. It is actually much more difficult, or not an automatic process, to raise new actors and groups that cut across the social spectrum (without reference to traditional social hierarchy), without intervention from outside.

### **Improvement of the group participation**

The elements in this section are arguments to take into account in reinforcing community participation.


- **The weakening power of Sheikhs:** the context in refugee camps has changed the Sheikh system. The Sheikhs still maintain a central position in the social life of refugee camps. But their power is declining with the loss of their economic power and the corrupt practices that have brought shame upon them. The Sheikhs are losing their power also because of the emergence, in the very Islamized local context, of deviant activities, such as the production and consumption of alcohol, the rise in prostitution, and threats and violence. While this problem is being addressed in Ardamata

camp, it has reached alarming proportions in the Riyadh and Dorti camps. To address the problem in Riyadh, an *Alcohol Working Group* was set up. But this group had to cease all its activities after the members received threats. In Dorti, sector D welcomes people who come from outside the camp (city dwellers, Chadian rebels) to look for prostitutes, alcohol and drugs. The same happens in Riyadh. These activities go on with the complicit involvement of some Sheikhs who provide shelter for women to produce alcohol and take rent in return<sup>20</sup>. The complicit behavior and/or inability of the Sheikhs to halt these deviant and illicit practices have helped to discredit them in front of the other social actors. The fact that the Sheikhs want to monopolize resources and subordinate the performance of collective functions to the payment of incentives<sup>21</sup> proves to many that they no longer serve the community as they used to do before in the village setting. All these things contribute to weaken their social position and their power.

- **Changes in the attitudes of Sheikhs.** The Sheikhs are progressively becoming more open-minded. The camps covered by our survey are located in the suburbs and the Sheikhs are slowly learning the values of city life. The contact with international agencies and the emphasis these agencies place on equity have surely made an impact on them. Similarly, the training they have received in several areas has caused them to adopt new positions. In Dorti, the Sheikhs who were trained in *Women Protection* and *Violence against women* do provide support to the women's associations that assist female victims of sexual abuse.


- **Network analysis and participation empowerment.** A network analysis highlights the set-up and position of actors and social interactions. Visualizing the network set-up helps us read and understand power relations and their implications. In the graphs below, the blue knots represent the IDP group of actors, including the Sheikhs (knot A); the red knots represent external actors (HAC, UN agencies, NGOs); and the arrows (one-way and two-way arrows) plot out the social interactions and what they stand for. The Sheikh system in the camps is a set-up where the Sheikhs have a central position (Network 1).

- Social interactions permit the movement of goods, resources and information. The central position that the Sheikhs occupy is a source of power, for it allows them to control resources and information transmission. Here are a few examples that can help us assess the central position of Sheikhs. When the Sheikhs



get an incentive for receiving food rations, this is a sort of tax to which they are entitled, or which they claim, by virtue of their position as intermediaries between the IDPs and WFP. The Sheikhs are the driving belt of information from IDPs or foreign agencies. The following two examples show that they have the power to filter, retain or even adulterate the information. Despite the clauses established between the Sheikhs and Tdh, the former choose sometimes not to report cases of sexual abuse to Tdh staff who receive the information only long afterwards. A Sheikh may decide not to mention that an IDP is under his responsibility in the case of conflict just to stop him/her from getting goods or services<sup>22</sup>.

Another set-up is that of a dense network and split interactions (Network 2) that make it possible for each player in a group (external organization) to be in contact with the other actors (individuals and social groups).



Such a network looks like a community participation model. The movement of resources and information can go by different paths and knots. In such a set-up, power is shared instead of being concentrated at the level of knot A. The induced cost of having an intermediary is lower than in the centralized network, because other passage points exist.

The current situation in the camps is complex and represents a combination of our two models. There are several actors and interactions. Diversified interactions without intermediaries should be encouraged, instead of the model where the Sheikh is the central figure through whose hands all things must pass.

- **Survey on community participation.** The opinion of IDPs is a key element for assessing the relevance of community participation. A series of indicators make it possible for us to survey the refugees.

A first indicator is the interest that the IDPs take in community decisions and events. This was to see how concerned they were by the decisions and events related to community life. Table n°4 shows the responses recorded. About 46% of the respondents show a keen interest, while 31% show little interest.

On the other hand, 5% say they are *not at all* interested. It is worth noting that a significant percentage (17.6) of *no responses* show that the subject is a sensitive one.

When asked whether they received minutes on the decisions made on camp management and community life, 71% of the IDPs said yes (see Table 11, Annex 4). On the contrary, 26% of the respondents said they rarely or never received the minutes.

This involves participation in various community activities, such as cleaning public areas and doing maintenance of water pumps. We present the responses in Table n°5 under two categories. About 12% of the respondents had never participated in any community activity, as against 88% who had participated effectively in community activities. The percentage of IDPs who are working may be quite high, but certain stakeholders on the ground said that the refugees who volunteer for this type of unpaid labor is smaller than expected. The responses may have been influenced by the desire to make a positive impression on the surveyors.

Table 4: Interest in decisions and community events

	Effectives	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulated Percentage
A lot	73	45.1	45.9	45.9
A bit	49	30.2	30.8	76.7
Not at all	9	5.6	5.7	82.4
No response	28	17.3	17.6	100.0
Total	159	98.1	100.0	
Missing	3	1.9		
Total	162	100.0		

Table 5: participation in community activities

	Effectives	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulated Percentage
Any community activity	19	11.7	12.0	12.0
Effective participation	139	85.8	88.0	100.0
Total	158	97.5	100.0	
Missing	4	2.5		
Total	162	100.0		

Should participation in the decision making process be improved? For over half of the IDPs surveyed (53%), participation in decision making needs to be improved considerably (Table n°6). On the other hand, 13% of the respondents have a contrary view, while 23% say they are more or less in favor of improved participation. On important decisions that affect them,

44% of the respondents want to be consulted much more than they are at present, while 21% want to maintain the current level of consultation. As Table n°7 shows, about 10% of the respondents are in favor of each of the other options.

Table 6: Improving participation in decision making

	Effectives	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulated Percentage
A lot	84	51.9	52.8	52.8
A bit	38	23.5	23.9	76.7
Not at all	21	13.0	13.2	89.9
No response	16	9.9	10.1	100.0
Total	159	98.1	100.0	
Missing	3	1.9		
Total	162	100.0		

Table 7: Consultation on important decisions

	Effectives	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulated Percentage
Much more than now	71	43.8	44.7	44.7
As same than now	34	21.0	21.4	66.0
Less than now	17	10.5	10.7	76.7
Not at all	16	9.9	10.1	86.8
I don't know	16	9.9	10.1	96.9
No response	5	3.1	3.2	100.0
Total	159	98.1	100.0	
Missing	3	1.9		
Total	162	100.0		

In short, slightly less than half of the respondents are highly interested in community decisions and events, while 88% participate actively in community life. Over half (53%) of them want to see improved participation in decision making, and 44% would like to be consulted much more than they are today on decision making. These different indicators show that the general trend is for an improvement of the current system and for more consultation in the decision making process.

### Recommendations

- Promote social stability and conflict prevention by including all the groups identified in the decision making process. Involving each and everyone effectively in camp community management, and giving them the opportunity to express their views on the issues that affect them, are the best means of *preventing frustration from piling up*, which is synonymous with a situation of latent conflict and the source of open conflicts.
- *Identifying and supporting social actors and groups* (youth, women especially, and any others) is a democratic way of exercising social power that is much more in line with respect for the fundamental human rights of one another.

This identification is to be made on the basis of the hierarchy-based social system guided by two principles of interpersonal social differentiation (micro sociological level): the gender and the seniority. At the meso-sociological level and the social stratification of the social groups, the lower castes can be under-represented in the community management. At the level of tribes (macro-sociological level), those members of a minority party are very probably under-represented.

However, we underlined previously that the emergence or the encouragement of a *group consciousness* referring to the identical reflex can show itself dangerous in the context of Darfur. In that case, it must be envisaged the ways of representation and direct designation without the constitution of targeted groups. This raises the problem of the election of the representatives in the absence of formal or informal structures.

- Encouraging the emergence of social actors and groups does not preclude the resurgence of identity issues, tribalism and discriminatory sectarianism. It justifies the permanent pursuit of a cross-cutting centre of interest, that is, one that brings together different segments of the community, and that *moves the object of differentiation and domination/competition*

outside the premises of the camp and the community. To reinforce cohesion and unity in each camp, it would be highly beneficial to organize and supervise *inter-camp competitions (or inter-sector competitions inside the camps) in areas such as: art, sport, shows, theatre, dancing*. It can be envisaged the following: 1) the setting up of theater companies for non professional actors who will work on relevant subjects and convey messages jointly identified with Tdh teams (social workers, EVI, awareness); 2) inter-sector competitions as well as inter-camp football competitions for young people; 3) the appeal to refugees artists or to traditional story tellers “griots” who could perform in various camps. It can also be envisaged in this perspective the creation of a sports and cultural association in each camp or at the level of each sector, which channels and supports such a program.

- Such recreational activities would certainly have a value-adding effect on the *psycho-sociological well-being* of the IDPs and the *dynamism of the community*. Such activities could be articulated perfectly with those of the Tdh *Social Work Team* and *Awareness Team*. The sports and theatre activities are useful and very well adapted for channeling relevant messages to target groups.

- Seek the *empowerment* of community groups and entities by reinforcing awareness of the political role that each of the stakeholders has to play in an open and democratic space at the local level. The idea is to facilitate the progressive implication of the IDPs in the management of the camps. This may involve that the IDPs: 1) lead the meetings of the Camp Coordination Working Group, 2) participate in negotiations with the partner institutions, 3) make the follow-up of the actions and the measures on the field, 4) represent the CCWG outside the camp, 5) be reporter during the meetings, 6) be given responsibilities in the implementation of programs, 7) proceed to the evaluation of impact of certain programs and ongoing actions.

- *Training in community participation* has a real impact even if the effects may take time. Specific training on community participation should be organized. Another less expensive option is to include this theme in the training programs related to community life, or targeting actors and groups that may be represented in community management.

- As soon as possible, *training* on and with the theme of community participation should *take place outside the camps*. Not only do IDPs appreciate freedom of movement and outing opportunities; the possibility for them to distance themselves from their natural environment helps to make them more receptive.

- Award *certificates* after training exercises and workshops to give them more value.

- Continue to *sensitize and raise the awareness* of individuals and target groups (for example during *awareness meetings*), who are likely to participate in community life. The goal of achieving community participation may take time, because assimilation and adaptation on the scale of a society is different from that of the human person. There is need therefore for strategy; and for patience as well.


- *Value the commitment of pioneers* of community participation: Promote role models participating in community life who belong to groups that are vulnerable or discriminated against. The idea is to mark the recognition of pioneers of community participation. To do so, instituting a prize award or token incentive (preferably non-financial) would make it possible to support and expand the social impact of the commitment of pioneers of community participation.


- *Ensure the institutionalization of the existing structures* by Tdh, which could play a sponsorship role by supervising the election of various committees. This also involves instituting the structure by getting top authorities and foreign organizations to endorse its recognition. Depending on how serious the structure turns out to be and what its objectives are, Tdh may serve as a guarantee for their activities and initiatives.

- Consult with the respective international organizations on the *incentives* claimed by the Sheikhs, with the goal of adopting a single position on the matter. These *incentives* are a sort of grant that is hard to justify once it has been accorded, especially against the backdrop of poverty in the refugee camps. A joint initiative continues to be the best response for causing the Sheikhs to give up the incentives. The second stage would consist in promoting relevant, well-argued and transparent communication on the joint position agreed.

## Footnotes section 2

- <sup>9</sup> For Locoh (1995), «one of the key elements of African family institutions is respect for the elderly and the power they wield over the younger ones» (p.23, free translation from French language). Suffice it to say that the «age» criterion does not apply systematically, for the most elderly people are put to rest after a certain age.
- <sup>10</sup> World Food Program.
- <sup>11</sup> Because the refugee camps were filled progressively as the refugees arrived, some blocks are occupied mostly by a single community, while others do have a multitude of communities. The spatial organization of the camps and sectors is not based on grouping IDPs systematically by tribe. In other words, small communities that belong to the same tribe are placed in different blocks and sectors.
- <sup>12</sup> In some cases, several villages that belong to the same ethnic group chose one Sheikh to represent them before the authorities.
- <sup>13</sup> Refugee status is conferred by the HCR and represents official recognition of the entitlement to protection and services given to IDPs.
- <sup>14</sup> In this camp, the Sheikhs stopped women from attending literacy education classes on the grounds that it would alienate them from their culture.
- <sup>15</sup> We have indicated that in the village setting, the Sheikh is chosen from the dominant ethnic group. He is supposed to come from the upper social classes (not the lower class). He is expected to be experienced, hence the choice of older persons. Lastly, he should have a good economic background.
- <sup>16</sup> During the interviews, some of the resource persons said that half the number of Sheikhs are competent and take their roles seriously.
- <sup>17</sup> Before dismissing a Sheikh, there should be tangible evidence of corruption on his part and the prior consent of the community to dismiss him. The disgraced Sheikh is dismissed by the leader of Sheikhs in the camp and another one chosen by his community to replace him.
- <sup>18</sup> On the contrary, some IDPs say they must pay the Sheikhs 5 SDG per month to get their food rations.
- <sup>19</sup> Babett et Janszky (2007) indicate, in this regard, that the massive presence of arms in the region has brought about the collapse of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in the society.
- <sup>20</sup> In Riyadh, some estimates suggest that half the shelters were empty also because of the seasonal migration of some IDPs.
- <sup>21</sup> In Ardamata, the launch of the activities of a new body (Camp Coordination Working Group) is blocked by Sheikhs who are asking for payment or incentives. In the other camps, this body is operational but the demand for incentives is done systematically.
- <sup>22</sup> Organizations such the Sudanese Red Cross decide sometimes to do spontaneous distributions and call directly on the Sheikhs.





# 3

## Conclusion & Références

# Conclusion

This socio-anthropological study commissioned by Tdh has looked at the conditions and implication of community participation. The study was conducted simultaneously in the Ardamata, Dort and Riyadh refugee camps near El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur. The study was based on a comparative approach. The community participation model is fundamentally different from the Sheikh system. The Sheikhs draw their strength from the social hierarchy system in Darfur's tribal and traditional society, based on the guiding principles of gender and age. In the context of the refugee camps, this traditional system takes a new form that still places the Sheikhs in a central position between the IDPs and external organizations. Community participation for IDPs seeks to identify and empower other social actors and groups in camp management. While the passage from the Sheikh system to community participation has encountered resistance from the Sheikhs, social groups are organizing themselves in different ways from one camp to the other.

The study findings suggest that the Sheikhs are reacting differently when it comes to accepting the presence of young people, and especially women, in camp coordination committees. The fact that Geneina is near the refugee camps plays a major role in the developments in the camps. The jobs that the women and young IDPs from the camps obtain in the urban centre and the influence that the values of the city has, seem to be contributing to improve the status of women and youth in Riyadh and Dorti. In Ardamata, the Sheikhs are opposed to the presence of women in Camp Coordination Meetings, but have caved in to pressure from the youth who now use force against corrupt Sheikhs. The quantitative surveys on IDPs show that these latter are interested in camp management and wish to be consulted on the major decisions that affect them.

The study ends with strategic and operational recommendations for improving community participation.

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A blue-tinted photograph of a desert camp. In the center, a person wearing a headscarf and a long dress walks towards the left, carrying a large bundle of sticks or branches on their back. To the right, there is a structure made of vertical sticks and branches. In the foreground, a person is sitting on the sand, holding a large, shallow bowl. The ground is sandy and scattered with sticks and debris. In the background, there are more people and animals, possibly camels, in a flat, open landscape under a clear sky.

# 4

## Annexes

## Annexe 1: Questionnaires

### Camp Coordination Questionnaire: the English version

Date: ..... /09/2009 .....

Full by: .....

Camp: Ardamata / Dorti / Riyad

Sector: .....

- 1) Name: ..... 2) Age: ..... 3) Sex: M  F
- 4) Education (level of) : .....
- 5) Main occupations:
- a) Housework: housekeeping, firewood collecting, nursing .....
- b) Professional job (with short or long training course): .....
- c) Economic activities: farming, commerce, NGO employee, ... ..
- 6) Matrimonial status: single • married • divorced • widowed
- 7) Type of your family:  Monogamy  Polygamy
- If adult, and married {
- 5.a) For men: number of wives: .....
- 5.b) For women: rank of marriage: .....
- 8) Link with the head of the household:  me  my .....
- 9) Number of child under your responsibility: .....
- 10) Number of siblings in your household: .....

11) From which tribe are you?

- Abu Darug    Arenga    BorgFur    Jabal    Jabelor    Massalit  
 Misaria    Shala    Tama    Zagawa    Zimer  
 Other, indicate which one: .....

12) In which community are you living with actually?

- a)  Tribe community  
b)  Villager origin  
c)  (Previous) neighbor of the village  
d)  Others, precise: .....

13) Are you (with your family) under the responsibility of a:  
(Who is the leader of your community?)

- a)  Sheikh  
b)  Sheikha  
c)  mixed committee  
d)  Other, precise: .....

14) What kind of problems do you have to face inside the camp?

- Water    Food    Health    Shelter    N.F.I.    Security  
 Leisure activities I.G.A.    participation in making decision  
 Child scholarship  
 Others: .....

**10) Number of siblings in your household**

	My-self	My family	My Sheikhy Sheikh	My neighborhood	Community Committees	NGO Agencies
Food						
Water						
Health						
Non food item						
Security						
Income						
Generating activity						
To solve conflicts						
Financial support						
Moral support						
Administrative procedures						
Other services...						

**16) Do you feel concerned by decisions and events on your community life?**

- a)  A lot
- b)  A bit
- c)  Not at all
- d)  No response

**17) Do you receive report about decision on community life and the camp management?**

- a)  Every time
- b).  Often

- c)  Sometimes
- d)  Rarely
- e)  Never
- f)  No response

**18)** Do you take part in community activities? Indicate which one(s)

- a) Working groups: .....
- b) Committees: .....
- c) Task force: .....
- d) Public area cleaning or maintaining:  Street sweeping  Water pump maintenance
- e) Other: .....

**19)** Does participation in making decision should be improved?

- a)  A lot
- b)  A bit
- c)  Not at all
- d)  No response

**20)** Do you want to be consulted for main decisions of your concern?

- a)  More than now
- b)  As than now
- c)  Less than now
- d)  Not at all
- e)  I don't know
- f)  Refusal

**21)** Do you receive training since your arrival in the camp?

- Yes, domain:.....  No

**22)** What do you plan to do (projects) in short or medium term?

- a)  Housekeeping
- b)  Find a job in the camp
- c)  Return to origin village
- d)  Other: .....
- e)  No one project
- f)  Refusal

**23)** How often do you easily access to the camp coordination team?

- a)  Every time
- b)  Often
- c)  Sometimes
- d)  Rarely
- e)  Never
- f)  No response

**24)** About Tdh management of the camp, how are you satisfied?

- a)  Very much
- b)  More or less
- c)  Not at all
- d)  No response

## Camp Coordination Questionnaire: the arabic version

التاريخ:.....  
المسؤول من اجراء اللقاء:.....  
المعسكر:.....  
القطاع بالمعسكر:.....  
الجزء الاول: تفاصيل شخصية

1/الاسم: \_\_\_\_\_ 2/العمر: \_\_\_\_\_ 3/النوع: ذكر  انثي   
4/ المستوي التعليمي: 1  ابتدائي 2  ثانوي 3  معهد مهني 4  جامعي 5  بدون تعليم  
5/المهن الرئيسية

1- الواجب المنزلي: تدبير شؤون المنزل، جمع الحطب، الممارسة  
2- عمل مهني: (به دورة تدريبية طويلة او قصيرة)  
3- الانشطة الاقتصادية: (الزراعة، التجارة، عامل بمنظمة  
6/ الحالة الاجتماعية: عازب  متزوج  مطلق  ارمل   
7/نوع الاسرة: احادي الزوجة  متعدد الزوجات   
اذا كان ناضجا و متزوج: [أ- للرجال: كم عدد الزوجات:.....  
[ب- للنساء:مرتبة الزوجية:(سواء كانت الزوجة الاولي او الثانية او الوحيدة و غيرها):.....  
8/العلاقة برب المنزل: والد  زوج   
9/ عدد الاطفال تحت مسؤوليتك:.....  
10/عدد الاخوان و الاخوات بالمنزل:.....  
11/الي اي قبيلة تنتمي:.....  
12/في اي مجتمع تعيش حاليا؟ 1- مجتمع القبيلة 2-  اهل قرينك الاصلية 3- مع جار سابق بالقرية 4-  او مع من تحديدا  
.....

13/من هو زعيم المجتمع الذي تعيش فيه حاليا؟

1. شيخ

2. شريحة

3. لجنة مختلطة

4. اي نوع اخر من انواع الادارة

14/ ما هي نوع المشاكل التي تواجهها داخل المعسكر؟

- 1- الماء □ 2- الصحة □ 3- الغذاء □ 4- مواد غير غذائية □ 5- السكن □ 6- الامن □ 7- الانشطة الترفيهية □  
8- المشاركة في صنع القرار □ 9- الانشطة المدرسة للدخل □ 10- منح دراسية للاطفال □ 11- اي مشاكل اخرى □

15/ علي من تعتمد في الاتي؟

ل منظمات ا	لجان	جاري	شيخي	عائلتي	نفسي	
	المجتمع					الغذاء
						الماء
						الصحة
						مواد غير غذائية
						الامن
						الانشطة المدرسة للدخل
						حل المشكل
						الدعم المالي
						الدعم عنوي
						الاجراءات الادارية
						الخدمات الاخرى

16/ هل تشعر بانك مهتم بالقرارات والاحداث في حياة مجتمعك :

1. نعم كثيرا
2. قليلا
3. ليس علي الدوام
9. لا يوجد رد

17/ هل تتلقى تقارير عن القرارات داخل مجتمعك او داخل المعسكر

1. دائما
2. غالبا
3. في بعض الاحيان

4. نادرا
5. ابدا
9. لا يوجد رد

18/ هل لك دور في النشاطات الاجتماعية

1. مجموعات العمل
2. اللجان
3. لجنة المهام
4. نظافة الاماكن العامة، المحافظة علي وصيانة طلمبة المياه اليدوية
5. صيانة الطلمبات

19/ هل يجب تحسين المشاركة في صنع القرار

1. كثيرا
2. قليلا
3. ليس علي الدوام
- 9- لا يوجد رد

20/ هل ترغب في ان تستشار في قراراتك الاساسية بشأن مشكلاتك؟

- 1- اكثر من الان
- 2- كما هو الحال
- 3- اقل من الان
- 4- ليس علي لدوام
- 5- لا ادري
- 9- رفض

21/ هل تلقيت اي دورة تدريبية منذ ان جئت الي المعسكر؟

- 1- نعم  ما هو مجال التدريب:.....
- 2- لا

22/ ماهي خطتك (مشاريع تفكر فيها) في المدي القصير او المتوسط؟

- 1- تدبير شؤون المنزل
- 2- ايجاد عمل بالمعسكر
- 3- العودة الي القرية الاصلية
- 4- ام ماذا
- 5- لا يوجد مشروع
- 9- لا اجابة

23 ما مدي يسر وسلوك الي اللجنة التنسيقية في المعسكر ؟

1. في كل وقت

2. غالبا

3. احيانا

4. نادرا

5. ابدا

9. لا يوجد رد

24/ في ما يتعلق بادارة منظمة ارض الانسان للمعسكر، الي اي مدي انت راض بذلك؟

1- راضي للغاية

2- الي حد ما

3. غير راضي

9- لا يوجد رد

## Annexe 2: Interview guide

**Name of interviewed person:**

**Date:** of September 2009

**Place:** Camp. Tdh Office. Other: ...

**Time of beginning=** ...h, **Time of the end=** ...h, **During time:**

### **Theme 1: general description of your work**

Organization and coordination of your work.

### **Theme 2: Global action and impact of Tdh**

Impact of Tdh action.

Satisfaction of IDPs and stakeholders about Tdh management of camp.

Positives and negatives aspects of Tdh management of the camps.

Problems relative to Tdh action management.

Global needs of IDPs.

### **Theme 3: general situation in the camps**

Humanitarian situation and recovery rate of needs: water, foods, health, and shelter.

Post-trauma state of children, women, vulnerable people (with handicap and traumatism).

Recreational activities for the sheikhs, men, women, elders, youth, children.

Social relationship. Relations inside the tribe communities.

Relations inside villager communities (villager origin).

Family relationship: Perception of ties within the family in the camp.

Social relationship for isolated person (without their families) (approximated percentage).

Perception of links with other IDP's (out of the family).

#### **Theme 4: Sheikh's role in the camps**

Roles of the sheikhs and their status.

How they conduct their power. Types of leadership.  
Ways of power sharing for or by women and youth.

Behavior\acting\violence inside the camp.

Distinction of internal and external violence.

The maintaining of order and peace inside the camp.

#### **Theme 5: hopeful and effective participation**

Existing instances: Working Groups (ex. raining season working group), Task force committees. Frequency of meetings.

In facts, what is the attendance of the sheikhs, the women, the youth, the vulnerable people (rate of attendance)?

Actual criteria of participation in instances and committees. Who fixe the criteria (Sheikhs, NGO, HAC, other).

Actual conditions of participation (rents, incentives, acceptation of sheikhs or Tdh/stakeholders).

Assessment and level of efficiency of the different participants.

#### **Theme 6: perception of community representativeness**

Complaining, request and demand from non-or under-represented people.

Perception of women capacity participation and representation on management committees.

Perception of child capacity participation and representation on management committees.

Improvement of the community participation.

Perspectives to develop.

## Annexe 3: Focus group guide

(Answering from women/youth position)

### 1. Life in the camp

- Comparison to life in the village: positive and negative aspects.
- Types of activities performed by women/youth

### 2. Problems to face in the camp

- General needs
- Social, family, marital difficulties
- Actions and ways to solve problems

### 3. Dynamism of the group

- Type of organization: existing committee, way of functioning
- Place for meeting
- Frequency of meetings
- Issues and subjects of discussion during meetings
- Recreational activities
- Initiatives taken
- System of representativeness, Leadership

### 4. Participation empowerment

- Relationship with other groups: Sheikhs/Elders/Women/Youth
- Deputy choice making for the group
- Effective participation in authorities of decision: committees, working groups, task force, camp coordination
- Improvement of participation of the group

## Annexe 3: complementary data and results

Table 8: Number of respondents by camp

	Frequency	Percent
Ardamata	50	31.4
Dorti	44	27.7
Riyad	65	40.9

Table 9: Gender distribution of the respondents

	Frequency	Percent
Male	67	42.1
Female	92	57.9
Total	159	100.0

Table 10: Age Categories

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Young	95	59.7	60.1	60.1
	middle age	53	33.3	33.5	93.7
	Old	10	6.3	6.3	100.0
	Total	158	99.4	100.0	
Missing System		1	0.6		
Total		159	100.0		

Table II: reporting about decisions

	Effectives	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulated percentage
Every time	42	25.9	26.4	26.4
Often	29	17.9	18.2	44.7
Sometimes	42	25.9	26.4	71.1
Rarely	26	16.0	16.4	87.4
Never	15	9.3	9.4	96.9
No response	5	3.1	3.1	100.0
Total	159	98.1	100.0	
Missing	3	1.9		
Total	162	100.0		

## Footnotes section 4

<sup>23</sup> 1. No scholarship, 2. Primary, 3. Secondary, 4. Professional school or training, 5. University.

<sup>24</sup> Non Food Item

<sup>25</sup> Income Generating Activity



## **IMPRESSUM**

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This study has been possible with  
the collaboration and coordination  
of all members of Tdh team in  
Soudan – Thanks to all the team!


**LAY-OUT/** Isabel HEDIGER


**MATRIX DESIGN & PRODUCTION/**  
Olivia WERMUS


**PICTURES /** The pictures  
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